Union College

Union | Digital Works
Honors Theses

Student Work

6-2012

Forgiveness in Ancient Rome: A review of
contemporary forgiveness clementia Caesaris and
Senecas De clementia
James Sedlak
Union College - Schenectady, NY

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalworks.union.edu/theses
Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, and the
Philosophy Commons
Recommended Citation
Sedlak, James, "Forgiveness in Ancient Rome: A review of contemporary forgiveness clementia Caesaris and Senecas De clementia"
(2012). Honors Theses. 899.
https://digitalworks.union.edu/theses/899

This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Union | Digital Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors
Theses by an authorized administrator of Union | Digital Works. For more information, please contact digitalworks@union.edu.

	
  
	
  
	
  
FORGIVENESS IN ANCIENT ROME: A REVIEW OF
CONTEMPORARY FORGIVENESS, CLEMENTIA
CAESARIS, AND SENECA’S DE CLEMENTIA

BY

JAMES J. SEDLAK

*************	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
Honors in the Department of Classics and the Department
of Philosophy

UNION COLLEGE
JUNE, 2012

ABSTRACT

SEDLAK, JAMES Forgiveness in Ancient Rome: A review of contemporary
forgiveness, clementia Caesaris, and Seneca’s De clementia.

This thesis explores the question of modern forgiveness in the lives of ancient
Romans. Specifically, did their understanding of clementia reflect contemporary
forgiveness? In the first chapter, I analyze five views on forgiveness and offer my own
account. In the second chapter, I explore clementia in the life of Julius Caesar during the
Roman Republic. In the third chapter, I analyze Lucius Annaeus Seneca’s philosophy on
clementia in Imperial Rome.
I created my own account of forgiveness to provide a basis for investigating and
comparing clementia Caesaris and Seneca’s De clementia. I chose Caesar and Seneca
because they are two of the most prolific personas responsible for the development of
clementia in pre-Christian Roman history, the former in practice and the latter in theory.
In an attempt to achieve a comprehensive analysis in my research I used primary and
secondary sources to understand the philosophy of forgiveness and moral significance of
clementia. I argue that contemporary forgiveness, as I define it, existed in ancient Rome.
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INTRODUCTION

I find it hard to deny that human beings have an unfixable propensity to err.
Imperfection is simply part of the human condition. But, just as it is in our power to err, it
is in our power to forgive. In the words of eighteenth century poet, Alexander Pope, “to
err is human, to forgive [is] divine.”1 However, while some like Pope consider
forgiveness a divine deed, I consider it as equal a part of the human condition. Moral
agents have different moral relationships with each other. Some are pleasant while others
are grim. Some are deep while others are superficial. Albeit when human beings err, they
tend to err against other human beings. In order to fix moral relationships in the
situations, we may choose to forgive. We talk about people as victims, offenders,
forgivers and repenters. But what really is forgiveness?
Charles Griswold offers a brief answer:
A moment’s reflection reveals that forgiveness is a surprisingly complex
and elusive notion. It is easier to say what it is not, than what it is.
Forgiveness is not simply a matter of finding a therapeutic way to deal
‘deal with’ injury, pain, or anger – even though it does somehow involve
overcoming the anger one feels in response to injury. If it were just a name
for a modus vivendi that rendered us insensible to the wrongs that
inevitably visit human life, than hypnosis or amnesia or taking a pill might
count as forgiveness. Our intuitions are so far from any such view that we
count the capacity to forgive – in the right way and under the right
circumstances – as part and parcel of a praiseworthy character.2

1

Alexander Pope. An essay on criticism. By Alexander Pope, Esq;. London, 1758. Eighteenth Century
Collections Online. Gale. Union College. 6 Mar. 2012
<http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGroupName=nysl_ca_u
nionc&tabID=T001&docId=CW116671129&type=multipage&contentSet=ECCOArticles&version=1.0&d
ocLevel=FASCIMILE>.
2
Forgiveness, xiv.

1

Forgiveness, as a practice or concept, can permeate multiple disciplines. A common
dictionary definition of forgiving is to “cease to feel resentment against on account of
wrong committed.”3 This is partially correct; it is missing the moral reasoning behind the
act of forgiveness, which is what I plan to discuss. Chapter one aims to establish a
working account of forgiveness.
The first part of the chapter will review five different perspectives on forgiveness
by Bishop Butler, Leo Zaibert, David Konstan, Charles Griswold, and John Kekes. I have
chosen these five because I believe they contribute important elements to a discussion on
forgiveness. My goal in reviewing each account is to create my own account of modern
forgiveness and argue against the paradigm view, that forgiveness is a conditional,
bilateral phenomenon.4 I hope to provide compelling answers to how we forgive and why
we forgive. I will also discuss the desirability of different forms of forgiveness and why
the other accounts fail to capture the essence of forgiveness. Ultimately I discuss why my
account of forgiveness is reasonable to adopt. Whenever I mention forgiveness, I am
referring to ‘contemporary forgiveness.’
Despite extensive research on forgiveness over the centuries, forgiveness in
ancient Rome has remained relatively uncharted territory for philosophical exploration.
Perhaps one of the main reasons for this lack in scholarly exploration is that forgiveness
simply did not exist.5 Or perhaps scholars have been misled to believe such a thing.
Nonetheless, I believe the issue of forgiveness in ancient Rome remains inconclusive and
3

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1971) s.v.
“forgive.”
4
Griswold, Forgiveness, xv.
5
David Konstan deals with this question at great length. He makes his position very clear in the opening
preface by claiming that “the modern concept of forgiveness, in the full or rich sense of the term, did not
exist in classical antiquity, that is, in ancient Greece or Rome… it played no role whatever in the ethical
thinking of those societies” (BF, ix). His work inspired me to write this thesis.

2

intriguing. Forgiveness may have very well existed in ancient Rome if we make some
general assumptions about the kind of people the Romans were.
Let us make some basic assumptions. The Romans were moral agents with a
moral awareness. That is, they had a concept of what ethical behavior meant. However,
being a moral agent with a certain moral character may not jointly suffice for practicing
forgiveness. So what else can we assume about them? The Romans were human beings
with nearly identical motivations for self-preservation in a moral community. In other
words, the act of moral rehabilitation is critical to an individual’s capacity to function in a
society with norms and order. I believe we have the same relationship to the moral norms
and order of society today. I find this sense of moral realignment to a community
characteristic for all rational moral agents. Again, these are just preliminary
considerations but they may encourage the reader to adopt an open-minded approach to
my query.
The above considerations alone do not warrant this investigation. Forgiveness is
represented by several words in the ancient languages. These words are sprinkled
throughout ancient texts so we may postulate that the authors of said texts had an
understanding of forgiveness. But was it the understanding of forgiveness we have today?
That is the question the second half of the paper explores. My search through textual
evidence leads me to argue the ancient Romans possessed an understanding of
forgiveness in thought. The evidence I analyzed did not support forgiveness in practice.
For the Greeks, the closest equivalent to forgiveness is sungnômê. Some
meanings include to sympathize, forgive, pardon, or excuse.6 In the Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle claims sungnômê occurs when external forces drive one’s will (in the case of
6

Griswold, Forgiveness, 3.

3

involuntary or forceful situations such as when one is held at gunpoint and ordered to do
something). In such cases, the individual is absolved of blame from doing wrong.
Aristotle suggests sungnômê can also occur when one follows one’s epithumia (natural
desire), which is common to all men, like pleasure and pain.7 In a general diagnosis of
Aristotle’s work Griswold claims that Aristotle leaves no rooms for sungnômê in his
“ethical perfectionist” ideology and negelcts forgiveness as a virtue; sungnômê as
forgiveness doesn’t have much ethical significance.8 Nonetheless, we will be focusing on
forgiveness as translated into Latin, after Aristotle wrote on the topic.
The English translation for ignosco ~ ignoscere ~ ignoscov ~ ignoscotum is: “to
forgive (a person or offence).” Numerous authors use it: Cato, Cicero, Plutarch, Livy,
Caesar, the list continues.9 Even though this translation is a direct match for the English
word, ‘forgive,’ I am not focusing on it in my project. Words like ignosco, lenitas, and
clementia (arguably synonymous) all adopt a unique meaning in which context they are
supplied. For example, lenitas in one context may be more the equivalent of clementia
and vice versa. I am focusing on clementia because of the prominent players responsible
for giving it such a comprehensive reputation in ancient Rome. I am referring to Julius
Caesar and Lucius Annaeus Seneca. Clemency translates to “a disposition to spare or
pardon, leniency; complaisance.”10 While clementia may not be the most precise
translation of forgiveness, its usage in ancient texts and scholarly commentary provide
the insight I am seeking. Caesar’s prose offers a perspective on Roman mercy in practice
7

Griswold, Forgiveness, 5.
Ibid., 8-10.
9
OLD, 824.
10
Ibid., 336. Also, for those who think contemporary forgiveness entails a change of heart in the wrongdoer
and victim, it is difficult to find textual support. The Latin word paenitentia means “regret for one’s
actions, change of mind or attitude” (OLD, 1282). David Konstan mentions that Robert Kaster “remarks
after an exhaustive study of the Latin paenitentia and related words, the idea of ‘a change of heart that
leads one to seek purgation and forgiveness’ was unknown to pre-Christian Romans”(BF, 11).
8
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while Seneca’s work offers a perspective on Roman mercy in theory. The analysis of
each and whether they reflect contemporary forgiveness will be the purpose of chapter
two and chapter three, respectively.
For matters of clarification I reckon ‘ancient Rome’ to correspond to the years
between the end of the Republic and the beginning of the Empire (circa 100 B.C. – A.D.
100). This time frame was not chosen for any specific reason with respect to the
development of forgiveness. I am choosing the works of Caesar and Seneca because they
write at the end of the Republic and early Empire, respectively. I am aware that this is a
very limited study considering the extent of ancient Rome; I concede this flaw.
I will also be discuss forgiveness as a virtue and clementia as a virtue. However, it
may come up sporadically when appropriate. M. B. Dowling writes clementia came to be
that by which a man’s character was measured (in the Roman world).11 While clemency
as a virtue is an important consideration to take in mind, I argue we ought to understand
clementia as a moral phenomenon because it became part of the common Roman ethic; it
wasn’t merely a characteristic. Furthermore, I argue it has a moral foundation. I also
believe it is a mistake to think of forgiveness as a virtue.
I conclude this paper by arguing textual evidence supports my theory of
forgiveness existed in ancient Roman thought.

11

Dowling, Clemency, 2.
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UNDERSTANDING FORGIVENESS: A REVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY
FORGIVENESS
Revenge is a kind of wild justice, which the more man’s nature runs to, the
more ought law to weed it out; for as for the first wrong, it doth but offend
the law, but the revenge of that wrong putteth the law out of office.
Certainly, in taking revenge, a man is but even with his enemy; but in
passing over it, he is superior; … This is certain, that a man that studieth
revenge keeps his own wounds green, which otherwise would heal and do
well.12

Forgiveness can mean different things for different people. We may forgive our
neighbor for forgetting to water our plants while we go on vacation, forgive a deceased
one for some prolonged, unaddressed wrongdoing, forgive a criminal, and so on.
Forgiveness can be defined across different disciplines. For example, political
forgiveness can be the President pardoning a criminal; economic forgiveness can be
freeing one of debt. Despite the wide understanding of forgiveness, only a small portion
of such acts count as moral forgiveness. In other words, they have a genuine, moral
backing. The goal of this chapter is to review five different perspectives on moral
forgiveness and develop my own account. I will argue why my account of forgiveness is
more reasonable to adopt despite its unique character. I propose forgiveness is the
forswearing of revenge in order to maximize one’s well-being after an injury. It is an
unconditional, intrapersonal phenomenon by the victim, for the victim.
Among scholars who write on forgiveness, David Konstan and Charles Griswold
construct conditional accounts of forgiveness. Their accounts underscore the importance
of the wrongdoer and victim partaking in moral reflection. Hence, their accounts are
12

Francis Bacon, The Essays, ed. Samuel Harvey Reynolds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890), 34.
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interpersonal. Others like Bishop Joseph Butler and Leo Zaibert understand forgiveness
differently Butler understands forgiveness into the way in which we deal with
resentment. Zaibert’s account involves the victim of an injury “deliberately refus[ing] to
punish” through an intrapersonal mental process.13 The latter two accounts attempt to
reconcile resentment and forgiveness whereas Konstan and Griswold consider
forgiveness to mean the abolishment of resentment, or at least the commitment to such;
they also contain threshold conditions for forgiveness. These conditions make up the
paradigm account of forgiveness:
1. The willingness – whether in fact, or as imaginatively reconstructed by
a suitable qualified third party – of the victim to try to lower her pitch
of resentment, as well as her ability to do so to some minimal degree,
and forswear revenge (this of course assumes that the victim does or
would feel resentment for the injury done; if not even that is felt, then
of course (1) fails to come into play at all);
2. The willingness – whether in fact, or as imaginatively reconstructed by
the victim (picture the victim being presented with the offender’s
death-bed letter of contrition, for example, that supplies a basis for
reframing her view of the offender) – of the offender to take minimal
steps to qualify for forgiveness;
3. That the injury be humanly forgivable.14
John Kekes presents an argument for the incompatibility of forgiveness and reasonable
blame. I plan on using his work to help argue against why the standard paradigm view
should indeed be the standard view of contemporary forgiveness. By the end of the
chapter I hope to have established a working definition of contemporary forgiveness.
Then, I will explore the question if contemporary forgiveness (as I define it) existed in
ancient Roman practice or thought.

13
14

Zaibert, Paradox, 368.
Griswold, Forgiveness, 115.
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Before we dive into the different views on forgiveness it is important to make
some preliminary remarks on preconditions and definitions. Forgiveness is a form of
reconciliation between moral agents in conflict.15 Moral agents have the capacity for
responsibility, guilt, self-awareness, and deliberation. These are traits of moral cognition
that allow for moral reconciliation and rehabilitation. We do not consider animals or
other non-moral agent entities capable of forgiving or being forgiven; they neither form
nor deliberate moral thoughts with an awareness of doing so, humans do. I find this point
unobjectionable and do not need to expand on it further.
So what sets the stage for forgiveness? There must be a blameworthy wrongdoer.
If A were to forgive B, A does so because A finds B to be guilty of committing some
offense. If A were to not find B blameworthy of said offense, A would have no logical
grounds for forgiving B. Forgiveness presupposes the forgiven agent has done wrong and
is responsible for it.
But what does it mean to do something wrong? Furthermore, to what extent can
moral agents be held responsible for their actions? I do not wish to dive too deep into this
discussion because it can create a lengthy digression. To do something wrong is to
transgress another individual’s autonomy. In most cases this is intentional but it need not
be. Furthermore wrongdoing may or may not cause harm. A bank robber, who believes
the bank teller pressed the emergency 911 button, pulls the trigger on the gun he is
pointing at the teller. The gun misfires because it jams. Had the gun not been jammed, the
bank robber would have 1) deliberately chosen to injure the teller and 2) physically
harmed the teller. In the scenario given, the robber only deliberately chose to injure the

15

Konstan, BF, 2: “[the sense of forgiveness] is one that involves a commission of a wrong and a certain
kind of foregoing in respect to the wrongdoer.”

8

teller but he still did something wrong because the act of ‘holding up’ the teller is
transgressing her autonomy.
Furthermore, to we conceive of wrongdoers as individuals who are blameworthy
when they act with mens rea.16 Having a guilty mind means that an individual intends to
do wrong without any mitigating circumstances, i.e. the bank robber. If the act were
unintended, then the act may be easily excused or absolved in some other non-forgiving
manner. But it is plausible to blame someone for an unintentional wrongdoing as well.
An individual is blameworthy in as much as she is responsible for her action. She is
certainly responsible for her action if she intended for it to happen. Furthermore, she is
responsible for an action if she intentionally allows said action to happen, without
actually intending it.17 Konstan offers a different perspective on blameworthiness. He
states “to be responsible for something in the sense of having a causal relation to the
outcome is not all that is meant by modern writers who insist on the acknowledgment of
culpability [as a precondition for forgiveness]. What is demanded at the very least is
regret… the wish that one had not performed the act and that the outcome were different”
(BF, 9).18 Later on I discuss why this is unnecessary.

16

Hart, Punishment, 36: while mens rea is defined as an “intention to commit an act that is wrong in the
sense it is legally forbidden” forgiveness need not be concerned with only illegal wrongdoings. The moral
analogy of mens rea is pertinent to our discussion of blameworthiness.
17
Kekes, Roots, 59: “ Choice is not the pivot on which responsibility turns, not because the pivot is
something else, but because there is no pivot… lack of choice does not preclude the assignment of
responsibility.” For example, Adolf Eichmann intentionally carried out orders to send thousands of
innocent people to their deaths yet he claims he was just doing his job. Regardless, he is responsible,
Although some may chalk up Eichmann’s failure to recognize the consequences of following orders to
negligence, it is not implausible to consider this quasi-act of negligence a form of mens rea and thus
blameworthy. Hart states “I think there is much to be said in favour of extending the notion of ‘mens’
beyond the ‘cognitive’ element of knowledge and foresight, so as to include the capacities and powers of
normal persons to think about and control their conduct. I would therefore certainly follow Stephen [Sir
James Fitzjames Stephen] and others and include negligence in mens rea because, as I shall argue later, it is
essentially a failure to exercise such capacities” (Punishment, 140).
18
He goes on to claim that “the demand [for forgiveness to occur] is for a deeper awareness, which includes
the acknowledgement that what the offender did was morally wrong, complete with the rejection of such

9

So far I have discussed the object of forgiveness: the blameworthy wrongdoer.
Furthermore, we can forgive someone whom we perceive to be a blameworthy
wrongdoer too. The wronged individual, the person to whom an injury or harm was
directed, must perceive the wrongdoing they suffered. Forgiveness is a moral
phenomenon in response to a specific perceived wrongdoing. If the teller does not believe
the robber was the one to shoot her, it makes no sense for her to forgive the robber for
shooting her. On the flip side of this scenario, let us say the teller believes the robber
harmed her when he in fact did not. Let us assume the robber’s accomplice shot her
instead. Can she still forgive the robber for shooting her? I suggest the teller can. Just as
one is able to conjure false anger or resentment toward another, one is able to forswear it
or somehow get rid of it. This presents an important point; should forgiveness be defined
within intrapersonal or interpersonal parameters? If it is intrapersonal, the reasoning I
gave seems to stand. If it is interpersonal, the robber would have to somehow qualify for
his forgiveness (per the second threshold condition of the paradigm view). But this may
not work because the robber would be repenting for something he did not do. If we
believe forgiveness is an interpersonal phenomenon, then we need a condition where “the
acquisition of a new self… must nevertheless be revealed to the injured party, if
forgiveness to be granted; for forgiveness depends on the conviction that the offender has
truly had a change of heart.”19 If we believe forgiveness is an intrapersonal phenomenon,
then this condition is simply unnecessary.

behavior in the future: not simple regret but remorse.” This will be a major point of contention when his
full account of forgiveness is discussed later on. Is this actually necessary for forgiveness? Also, how do we
ensure the wrongdoer has achieved ‘deep awareness’ through regret or remorse?
19
Konstan, BF, 10: This will be the central tenet of his account.

10

I will also be talking about resentment and revenge as responses to being
wronged. These two reactive attitudes express moral judgment and emotional response to
a wrongdoing.20 I understand resentment as the overarching reactive attitude to being
wronged. Revenge is the most extreme form of resentment where victims simply want to
‘get back’ at their offenders. While resentment is not the only reactive attitude to being
wronged, it is necessary for forgiveness to occur. If the victim felt no resentment toward
her offender, why else would she forgive them? The point of forgiveness is to negate
resentment. I will discuss the different degrees to which we can do this.
With resentment in mind, Butler’s view on forgiveness is a fitting place to begin
my analysis. He claims there are two types of resentment: “sudden or and settled.” He
elaborates by saying “sudden anger is often instinctive…” and that “… it cannot… be
imagined, that these instances of this passion are the effect of reason: no, they are
occasioned by mere sensation and feeling.”21 For example, I may summon a burst of
anger in response to slamming a car door on my finger. In this scenario, resentment
erupts involuntarily and is produced devoid of reason (toward the car door slamming on
my finger). Butler claims that “settled anger is properly a resentment against injury and
wickedness… [settled anger] is never occasioned by harm, distinct from injury; and its
natural proper end is to remedy or prevent only that harm, which implies, or is supposed
to imply, injury or moral wrong.”22

20

For more clarification on reactive attitudes: Strawson, P.F. Freedom and Resentment, and Other Essays
(New York: Methuen, 1980) 14-15.
21
Butler, Works, 139.
22
Ibid., 140-44: It can be easy to fall into confusion as Butler interchanges multiple words. Nevertheless,
“settled anger” is a response to a intentional wrongdoing and cannot derive from “harm.” Harm is
distinguished from injury; the latter is deliberately directed from one moral agent to another while the
former is basic physiological damage, like a car door slamming on one’s finger.
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Griswold states “the temporal projection of self into the future is one important
way in which sudden and deliberate anger are distinguished (Forgiveness, 23). Settled
anger is the form of resentment that involves moral judgment by reflecting on an injury;
it aims to hold the wrongdoer in moral contempt. Griswold sums up resentment in the
following way:
Resentment, then, is a moral sentiment in the sense that it is aroused by the
perception of what we (the spectator to the scene, or the victim) take to be
unwarranted injury. It is therefore not just a ‘raw feel’ but embodies a
judgment about the fairness of an action or of an intention to do that
action.23
Resentment is not limited to the parties involved; it can be “felt on behalf of
another…typically referred to as indignation (sympathetic resentment).” In making a
moral judgment about the unwarranted injury, the victim or sympathetic resenter can
develop resentment as a catalyst for retribution. The desire for retribution can often lead
to disproportionate punishments or irrational and immoral actions. Butler, thus, suggests
a way to prevent such things from happening to the victim or the sympathetic resenter.
In the following Sermon, Butler discusses the importance of moderating and
controlling resentment toward a wrongdoer. He states: “the precepts to forgive, and to
love our enemies, do not relate to that general indignation against injury and the authors
of it, but to this feeling, or resentment when raised by private or personal injury” (Works,
151). It is imperative for an individual to moderate their resentment because “unchecked
resentment is not a stable basis for assessing whether or when punishment is due, and

23

Griswold, Forgiveness, 26: He goes on to suggest Butler’s view of resentment “is a reactive as well as
retributive passion that instinctively seeks to exact a due measure of punishment.”

12

cannot by itself assess whether it has attained the appropriate pitch.”24 Unchecked
resentment is dangerous. For example, a wife who murders her husband after coming
home to find him committing adultery failed to moderate her resentment, giving in to
what Butler calls an ‘abuse’ of resentment.25 Abusing resentment constitutes letting the
negative emotions build and get the better of our moral judgment.
So, Butler claims that “it must be understood to forbid only the excess and abuse
of this natural feeling [resentment]” and that one need not renounce resentment all
together (Works, 152). The excess of resentment is revenge. Resentment aims to do good
(by holding the wrongdoer in moral contempt). So, there seems to be a necessary balance
to draw because when individuals act on revenge they put themselves and others in
peril.26 The balance is forgiveness. Butler urges us to seek forgiveness by forswearing
revenge.27 A victim can continue resenting their offender while forgiving them; these two
moral actions are compatible. In other words, we can continue to hold offenders in moral
contempt when we have given up the desire to exact revenge on our offenders. Butler
says we forgive because we love our enemy by seeing the traits of imperfection in each
other. He writes: forgiveness is “absolutely necessary, as ever we hope for pardon of our
own sins, as ever we hope for peace of mind in our dying moments (Works, 167).

24

Ibid., 31. Griswold goes on to say that “Butler underlines, as one of the greatest abuses of resentment, the
partiality of perspective the emotion can engender in its owner…Rightly focused, it is the legitimate
response to injury.”
25
Butler, Works, 144.
26
Griswold, Forgiveness, 31: “[revenge] is the most dangerous because it expresses the emotion in actions
designed to cause pain and misery, and because its character as a vice easily escapes us.”
27
Butler, Works, 158: “We may therefore love [show benevolence to] our enemy, and yet have resentment
against him for his injurious behavior towards us. But when this resentment entirely destroys our natural
benevolence towards him, it is excessive, and becomes malice or revenge. The command to prevent its
having this effect, i.e. to forgive injuries, is the same as to love our enemies; because that love is always
supposed, unless destroyed by resentment.”
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Prima facie this appears counterintuitive; how can one resent and love their
enemy? Butler suggests we love our enemy not in the sense a husband and wife love each
other by sharing feelings of intimacy but instead love each other by treating others justly.
Loving our enemy means not dehumanizing offenders as incapable of basic human
integrity. In other words, Griswold states “forgiveness is ‘love’ in the sense that it affirms
our commonality, as human beings, with the morally worst among us” (Forgiveness, 34).
Since we all have the propensity to err, we should forgive; victims may one day find
themselves in the shoes of an offender committing similar crimes.
How exactly does Butler suggest we forgive? How does one come to moderate
one’s resentment towards a wrongdoer? According to Butler, we can only come to
forgive our wrongdoer by “having the same feeling as a good man not injured… he [the
victim] ought to be affected towards the injurious person [wrongdoer] in the same way
any good men, uninterested in the case, would be…”28 In order to become uninterested in
the injury, Butler seems to suggest individuals should separate their perception of justice
into two realms: public and private. The public sphere of justice calls for penalties carried
out by a sovereign enforcing social norms. The private sphere of justice is between a
victim and her offender.29 I think these two realms of justice are what constitute Butler’s
second component of forgiveness: “the moderation of resentment as judged appropriate
by the “sympathetic good man and informed objective observer.”30 In other words, we
resent wrongdoers by making some kind of normative, moral judgment about their
behavior and we want to see them punished in a way that upholds justice. However, we
28

Butler, Works, 160.
Griswold, Forgiveness, 32.
30
Ibid., 36. Butler doesn’t explicitly distinguish the private and public sphere of justice; this is how I am
interpreting the perspectives of the “sympathetic good man” and informed objective observer.” However,
my interpretations could be inaccurate.
29
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do not let our resentment toward them develop into revenge and punish them ourselves.
We leave punishment to the public sphere of justice, for example the criminal justice
system.
Butler’s account is unusual because it reconciles forgiveness and resentment,
what we may intuitively believe are two diametrically opposed moral entities. His
account contains some flaws. First, Butler’s account fails to clearly distinguish at which
point resentment turns into revenge.31 If we do not know where this threshold exists,
judging when we have sufficiently moderated our resentment is at best a mystery.
Second, exacting revenge may not be acting irrational and abusing resentment.32 Why
can’t one control one’s resentment in a careful, cold-calculated plot of revenge? It is
plausible to believe such feats occur. A Butlerian could respond to this by saying this not
does love our enemy or acknowledge our common tendency to do wrong. I have two
responses to this: 1) this is basically saying the wrongdoer is precluded from blame since
they are ‘human’ and couldn’t change the fact that they have a tendency to err. This is an
insult to morality since it neglects the fact that people should be accountable for what
they do for the sake of public welfare and order; 2) in no way can I come to love
someone who has developed monstrous motivations to harm others, nor should I.
Consider morally callous, evil individuals like Charles Manson, who has left an
impact on history such that merely hearing their names makes us cringe, rattling our
innermost moral sentiments. How are such individuals capable of being forgiven under
Butler’s account? It is difficult to tell. I contend that these individuals forfeit their claim
to shared human sympathy when they commit such horrendous crimes against humanity.
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Charles Manson, did not feel, hurt and live as a common human being by plotting the
brutal murders of innocent targets. Had he felt, hurt and lived like a human being he
wouldn’t have done what he did.33 Butler fails to give a clear reason why we should still
love our enemy in these situations.34 However, he may say that these people should
simply be punished, without any debate:
It is necessary for the subsistence of the world, that injury, injustice and
cruelty should be punished; and since compassion, which is so natural to
mankind, would render that execution of justice exceedingly difficult and
uneasy; indignation against vice and wickedness is, and may be allowed to
be, a balance to that weakness of pity, and also to anything else which
would prevent the necessary methods of severity.35
Despite my criticisms, I agree with Butler on a fundamental point: forgiveness is
the forswearing of revenge but when punishment is obviously the answer to reconciling
moral conflicts, we ought to punish. Moral monsters may simply fall outside the reach of
forgiveness (their actions preclude them from such under the third threshold condition in
the paradigm view, i.e. their actions are unforgivable). They may also fall outside the
reach of forgiveness because they are incapable of having a change of heart. 36 However,
Zaibert’s account can render such moral agents forgiveable.
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Manson and his “so-called Family” brutally murdered seven innocent people. During the first night of the
rampage one man, perhaps the luckiest of them all, was shot four times. One pregnant woman was stabbed
sixteen times. Another woman was stabbed for a total of twenty-eight times after failing to escape the
attacks. Another man was struck over the head thirteen times, shot twice and stabbed fifty-one times. The
last victim for that night was a man, stabbed seven times, who was hung from a rafter with the rope tied
around the neck of the pregnant woman at the other end. The next night a man was stabbed twelve times,
punctured fourteen times with a double-tined fork and had the knife used to stab him lodged into his throat.
During the second night of murders, a woman was tied up in a bedroom and stabbed forty-one times. The
murderers wrote words like “death to pigs” and the misspelled “healter-skelter” with blood-drenched
towels. These were the “infamous Tate-LaBianca murders” (Kekes, Roots, 66-67).
34
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Kekes, Blame, 489.
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Zaibert’s account in The Paradox of Forgiveness emphasizes forgiveness is an
intrapersonal moral phenomenon that need not be communicated to the wrongdoer. Thus,
a moral monster can be forgiven independent of fulfilling any acts of repentance or
reconciliation. Zaibert coins “pure” forgiveness as “absolute forgiveness, unrelated to any
transaction or mutual undertaking between the wrongdoer and injured party” (Paradox,
382). In contrast, other views contend forgiveness is feasible only when the wrongdoer
and her victim fulfill respective responsibilities in a bilateral process. For example, the
paradigm account of forgiveness calls for the repentance of the wrongdoer.37 Zaibert’s
account proposes unconditional forgiveness as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

A believes that X is wrong,
A believes that X is an action of B,
A believes that B is a moral agent,
A believes that there are no excuses, justifications or other circumstances
which would preclude blame.
(5) A believes that the world would have been a better place had B dot done
X.
(6) A believes that the world would be a better place if something would
happen to B, something which would somehow offset B’s Xing.
(7) B’s having Xed tends to make A feel something negative, i.e., a reactive
emotion, like outrage, indignation or resentment.
A forgives B (as a pure mental phenomenon) when, in addition:
(8) A believes that the world would in fact be a worse place if A did
something to B in response to her wrongdoing, and thus A deliberately
refuses to try and offset B’s wrongdoing.
A forgives B (in the communicative sense) when, finally:
(9) A communicates to B, or to someone else that she has forgiven (in the
sense of a pure mental phenomenon) B.38
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Konstan, BF, 11.
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Zaibert’s account involves deliberation on moral judgments and reactive attitudes.
As seen in (7), A expectedly feels a deep negative conviction towards B, i.e. resentment.
And it isn’t until (8) when A pursues the mental act of forgiving B by forgoing any action
on her own part to counter B’s wrongdoing. I take this to be analogous to the Butlerian
view where the injured party forswears revenge. Furthermore, the act of forgoing revenge
is a private act independent of any conditions. Here, one might interject: wait! Zaibert’s
account is conditional. In fact, there are nine of them. This is failing to understand that
Zaibert’s account is unconditional in the sense that the victim need not depend on the
offender doing anything to warrant her forgiveness. His account is intrapersonal. We see
a component of interpersonal forgiveness in (9) where the victim may express her
forgiveness. However, this step isn’t required.
While (6) and (8) seem contradictory, they aren’t. (6) is concerned with
forswearing punishment similar to forswearing revenge.39 It would not make sense to still
want to punish someone after forgiving them. The very act of forgiving is to no longer
want to punish. (6) acknowledges the fact that the offender ought to be punished. (8) is
the decision by the victim that she should not be the agent to do it, or ‘offset B’s
wrongdoing.’ I understand this to be similar to a victim allowing the state (e.g. public
sphere of justice) to carry out punishment.
Butler and Zaibert’s accounts emphasize intrapersonal forgiveness centered on the
victim. Zaibert makes this very clear by laying out nine steps and this is why I am drawn
to it. Both versions also allow for continued resentment after forgiveness. This is
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Zaibert, Paradox, 389: The relationship between the two conditions is “to an extent understandable that it
may appear odd, since this is, I submit, the root phenomenon giving rise to all the versions of the paradox
of forgiveness: the forgiver believes that if a certain bad thing would befall the wrongdoer, this would be an
acceptable state of affairs, and yet she refuses to bring about this state of affairs herself.”
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important because it seems hard to believe that our emotional psychology is designed to
simply ‘turn off’ resentment after we forgive. It just doesn’t seem to work like that.
Despite being attracted to his account, I think Zaibert misunderstands the function
forgiveness plays in our lives. I do not think he is correct in claiming we refuse to offset a
wrongdoing because we come to realize the world would be a worse place if we carried
out said offsetting. So what if the world is a better place? Does it change anything about
the way live our lives? It wouldn’t change anything about our natural tendency to err.
This is praiseworthy and holistic but we forgive for purely selfish reasons. I will
elaborate on this point more later on when I present my account.
So far we have reviewed forgiveness in its intrapersonal unconditional form. This
emphasizes forgiveness is the forswearing of revenge (punishment for Zaibert) and it
need not involve communication to an offender, i.e. it is unilateral.40 I will now flip to the
other side of the coin.
Konstan endorses what some may consider the popular, contemporary view of
forgiveness in his book, Before Forgiveness: The Origins of A Moral Idea. Aside from
the preconditions we discussed earlier, Konstan presents three key conditions for
forgiveness. These conditions pertain to the forgiver, forgiven, and the relationship
between them.41 First, the forgiver cannot treat “the offense as negligible or unworthy of
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I take forswearing revenge (Butler) and forswearing punishment (Zaibert) to be analogous for all
intended purposes of creating an intrapersonal, unconditional core for forgiveness. I think Zaibert would
allow this since he writes “ I admit it that it is difficult to distinguish punishment from revenge, but, rather
than uncritically embrace venerable distinctions, I will argue that the standard arguments purportedly
showing ‘obvious’ differences between these two phenomena are not good” (PR, 4).
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wrongdoer/offender, respectively.
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attention.”42 Again, the victim must acknowledge her injury by believing it occurred by
the agent whom she intends to forgive.
Secondly, the offender needs to acknowledge her wrong. One issue with this is
the following: how genuine does the recognition need to be? Someone could simply say
they recognize their wrongdoing even though they do not care enough to actually do so,
arguably the case with psychopathic murderers. The point is, it may be harder than one
thinks to clearly reach a point where the offender has genuine deep awareness,
transformation of the self within the wrongdoer, not necessarily regret but remorse.43
Konstan goes on to argue remorse is the gateway emotion for repentance. In other words,
once the offender shows remorse then the possibility of repentance can actually begin.
This in turn leads to the conviction that the offender has truly had a change of heart,
setting the stage for the third condition.44
The third condition also relies on the offender. Specifically, this boils down to
whether or not there is indeed a change of heart in the offender, willingness on behalf of
the offender to recognize and repent their wrongdoing. If this is achieved, the victim
attempts to recognize and retract her resentment in response. Both acts constitute
forgiveness as a “dyadic relationship.”45 The following quote sums up Konstan’s view
well:
Forgiveness in the principal modern acceptation, let it be recalled, is not
reducible to the appeasement of anger, which may be achieved by
compensation, acts of self-abasement, the offer of plausible excuses for
one’s conduct, and other means; rather, it is a bilateral process involving a
confession of wrongdoing, evidence of sincere repentance, and a change
of heart or moral perspective – one might almost say moral identity – on
42
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the part of the offender, together with a comparable alteration in the
forgiver, by which she or he consents to forego vengeance on the basis
precisely of the change in the offender.46
Konstan’s view on forgiveness is similar to the description of the paradigm view
Griswold presents so I will save further criticisms and praises until after I discuss
Griswold’s work.
In his book, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, Charles Griswold
suggests forgiveness is giving up moral sentiments associated with revenge but
moderating resentment to an appropriate level (not giving in to the abuses of resentment
according to Butler).47 Resentment needs to be proportionate or less than the degree of
the injury “but the concession [to resent] holds only if the resentment is felt for a time
only” (Forgiveness, 42). In other words, forgiveness requires a commitment on behalf of
the forgiver to reach a clean state of mind, in which resentment is completely
relinquished. Furthermore, a we need a “trustworthy report that resentment is in fact
moving out the door – all under conditions where the offender has taken the appropriate
steps” (this is showing a willingness to repent, Konstan’s second condition).
‘Forgiveness’ may refer to that process or to the end state.”48 I take a “trustworthy report”
to mean genuine acknowledgement on behalf of both the victim and offender. For
smaller injuries the end state may be reached quickly; for more substantial injuries,
achieving the end state may require more time.
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Griswold describes forgiveness as a multi-step process with a specific goal: the
abolition of resentment. In his words, we can recognize lingering resentment after
forswearing revenge “only so long as there is commitment to its continued abatement”
(Forgiveness, 43). Hence, forgiveness is a continuum. Forgiving X for doing Y means
moderating resentment towards X to the degree of Y but forgiveness may not complete.
Relinquished resentment is the destination while moderated resentment, the forswearing
of revenge, is simply a pit stop.49 Griswold suggests more conditions constitute perfected
forgiveness.50 These conditions create a rehabilitative relationship between the victim and
offender; the offender depends on the victim to be forgiven while the victim depends on
the offender to forgive.51 The following six conditions are for the offender.
The first two conditions pertain to the wrongdoer acknowledging the need for a
change in moral standing. The offender must acknowledge that she was indeed
responsible for the wrongdoing and the offender must be able to demonstrate that she no
longer wishes to “stand by herself as the author of [said wrongdoing].” A sadistic
criminal can take responsibility for murdering children while remaining to feel content as
the author of such heinous acts. This person cannot be forgiven. The individuals who can
exercise genuine moral reflection and feelings of remorse can be forgiven. Second, the
offender must sincerely renounce the deeds done and repudiate the idea that it is possible
for her to commit the same wrongdoing again in the future if given the chance. 52
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Ibid., 43: “Indeed, if moderated resentment is still warranted all things considered, the forgiveness is
impossible or premature. Forgiveness does not attempt to get rid of warranted resentment. Rather, it
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The third and fourth conditions mark the beginning of the wrongdoer’s change.
The offender admits regret for having done the wrong and in some way communicates
said regret (i.e. conditions one and two) to the victim. Then the wrongdoer must commit
to the change she just expressed (i.e. the third condition). The fourth condition entails the
wrongdoer fulfilling acts of contrition. Wrongdoers cannot simply say to their victims
they will seek repentance and a change of heart. In other words, the offender must ‘walk
the talk.’53 Some examples may be attending self-help classes, doing philanthropic work
to illustrate a new and improved moral character etc.
The last two conditions describe a narrative of wrongdoing on behalf of the
offender’s moral experience, from the wrongdoing to repentance. In other words, the
offender is able to explain how she has come to cope with the wrongdoing, and what she
is doing to live a morally improved life after it. The wrongdoer must be able to
sympathize with the victim and fully understand what it feels like to be in the victim’s
shoes (the fifth condition). Once this is done, the offender needs to culminate the
previous conditions into a moral narrative, a narrative that illustrates understanding of the
act and what is being done to fix it.54 Until these conditions have met, it is neither wholly
right nor genuine for the victim to forgive the offender. Meeting these conditions ensures
the victim that the offender can be forgiven in response to the specific wrong they
committed.
As a whole these conditions qualify forgiving an offender but what does the
victim have to do to complete the process? The victim also has six conditions to meet.
53
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We have indirectly talked about three of them: forswearing revenge, moderating
resentment, and making a commitment to abolish resentment altogether. Conditions four
through six are as follows: 4) the victim evaluates the wrongdoer’s success in fulfilling
the offender’s conditions; 5) the victim comes to trust the offender has made sincere acts
of contrition and demonstrated appropriate remorse and is aiming for a morally improved
future. Steps four and five lead the victim to see herself in a new light that entails
“dropping any presumption of decisive moral superiority, and recognizes instead the
shared humanity of both parties.”55 Here, Butler’s plea to love thy enemy resonates.
Lastly (sixth step), the victim needs to somehow express to the offender her willingness
to forgive the offender, even if the act of forgiveness will not be complete for a long time.
This whole process, the mutual commitment to moral reformation, is what Griswold dubs
the “paradigm case of forgiveness.”56
The paradigm view of forgiveness is closely related to Konstan’s account.57 They
share three core tenets: moral reflection by the offender to a change their ways, moral
reformation on behalf of the victim by forswearing resentment in its entirety, and the
communication of both to each other. Furthermore, the “transformations that the offender
and victim undergo are mutually dependent, in our paradigm case of dyadic forgiveness,
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and they are asymmetrical.58 For the remainder of the discussion I will refer to the
Griswold/Konstan view as the “paradigm account.”59 This will be contrasted with the
Butlerian/Zaibert account. I will dub this the “unconditional account.”
The unconditional account is merit-worthy for a couple of reasons. First, this
makes the discussion of forgiveness credible for “we frequently forgive wile still
experiencing some anger.”60 It is more than plausible that individuals who have been
harmed still resent their offender degree after forgiveness has occurred and this can vary
depending on the severity of the inflicted injury. Second, this approach to understanding
forgiveness would preserve the intuition that complete forgiveness absolves resentment
when other virtues are exercised over time. For example, I can forgive my lover for
infidelity in the sense that I no longer want to exact revenge on her but it would take time
and healing for us to mend the relationship. This would require virtues like trust, selfconfidence, sympathy etc. But the paradigm account can rationalize these things too.
However, the paradigm account has more flaws than strengths. I will discuss them now.
The paradigm account fits our intuition that forgiveness is a morally beautiful
thing by improving the moral character of two individuals. Forgiveness guides both the
offender and victim to living better lives. But can’t our intuition be wrong about such a
thing? And even if a belief fits our intuition, what makes it reasonable? Furthermore, let
us assume it is a morally beautiful thing that leads moral agents to live better lives. Like
my criticism of Zaibert before, the act of forgiveness doesn’t change the fact that human
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beings are prone to err and the world still remains their playground. It is not guaranteed
moral agents will learn anything from forgiving that will prevent them from doing wrong
later on in life.
The paradigm case may also be praiseworthy because it involves the cooperation
of two agents. 61 Perhaps it is important to involve the offender in the forgiving process
because then it is genuine and meaningful for the victim to forgive. From a pragmatic
standpoint, the offender’s ability to meet their respective conditions seems doubtful from
the beginning. Nonetheless, I can see how the offender can be expected to meet such
requirements when a wrong between two loved ones or two friends occurs. They may
have too much on the line (e.g. their relationship) to simply neglect fulfilling their
responsibilities in the forgiving process. However, strangers brought together in a
relationship that is wholly defined by one inflicting an injury on the other have nothing to
lose if they choose not to meet the conditions of forgiveness. In such cases the offender
shouldn’t be expected to meet any requirements. Furthermore, an offender who does
wrong because it aligns with their moral character may be more unlikely to illustrate deep
awareness when self-reflection is called for. Also, deep awareness can mean different
things to different people; how is one to know one has achieved it? Above all, it is
unclear why the offender needs to play any role at all in the victim’s deliberation to
forgive?
The third strength of this account is its clear-cut structure. While it may have been
confusing to follow at times, this account can be printed into a ‘check-list’ for the
offender and victim. This would make the process much easier for both parties. Yet while
61
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it is clear, it simply asks for too much from both parties. I am not saying meeting all
conditions cannot be done; but it is a significant feat to accomplish. With that said, it is
plausible to believe the paradigm view, even in its threshold form, fails more often than it
succeeds.
I have mentioned that the paradigm case is too demanding but I have some other
criticisms. This account fails to give good enough reasons why forgiveness needs to be
communicative and interpersonal. A person may forgive a deceased member of their
family. A dead person cannot communicate. Defenders of the paradigm view may claim
that forgiveness is possible but only in the “subjunctive” where the “injured party may
work out a simulacrum of forgiveness by gathering data that help explain why the
offender acted so badly.”62 In other words, if the offender were alive, they would have
reflected and repented the way in which the living victim believes thru her ‘simulcrum.’
This is speculative at best and it doesn’t account for individuals choosing to forgive the
deceased. It is important to note simply letting go of resentment towards the deceased
after a long time is not forgiveness. This is merely making room to cope with the
resentment towards them. Forgiveness is all about making a free-willed choice. And we
often make free-willed choices to forgive disregarding the offender, as is the case with
forgiving the deceased.
I endorse the unconditional account because it doesn’t need to deal with these
issues. Forgiveness understood as an unconditional, intrapersonal act is simpler, yet this
doesn’t diminish its meaning. Since I am not in full support of either Butler or Zaibert’s
account I will offer my own. I argue forgiveness is forswearing revenge for the wellbeing of the victim. This is an act done by the victim, for the victim. Hence, it need not
62
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be communicated and there are no conditions. But before I present my account I wish to
explore forgiveness further and discover its natural function for human beings.
Why do different people forgive? The upstanding moral citizen who forgives out
of morally praiseworthiness forgives their wrongdoer to receive moral praise from others
(despite how self-interested this may sound). The devout churchgoer forgives to bring
herself one step closer to the principles of their religion. Those simply seeking moral
revival from past wrongs forgive their offender to move on with their life. None of these
are accurate reasons why we actually forgive. We forgive to fulfill a purpose. While a
hammer is pointless if it does not fulfill its intended purpose to strike nails, forgiveness
would be pointless if it did not do fulfill its intended purpose to rehabilitate the victim.
Victims rehabilitate themselves from an injury by maximizing their well-being in
response to said injury. Well-being is the state in which one is at peace of mind. Now it
may be delusional to believe perfect peace of mind can be achieved since we live in a
world with a variety of physical and mental threats. However, in order to preserve what
well-being remains or regain any lost well-being (from injuries) a victim can choose to
forgive. My well-being is most maximized when I foreswear revenge because by
foreswearing revenge I am bringing myself closer to peace of mind. One may ask, why
can’t victims pursue other means to achieve this well-being via peace of mind? For
example a victim can punish the wrongdoer herself or turn her cheek in moral
indifference. If a victim chooses one of these paths she simply chooses not to forgive.
And this is acceptable. Furthermore, couldn’t it indeed be in my well-being to exact
revenge? In harming the victim, the offender somehow and to some degree manifests a
threat to the victim’s well-being. By exacting revenge, the victim not only ‘settles the
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score’ but can neutralize the offender as a future threat. This seems to be in the victim’s
well-being.
One problem with revenge is the following. Pursuing revenge and endorsing the
resentment associated with it can actually inhibit peace of mind. It can sustain suffering
by making vengeance the focal point of living and sustained suffering is contrary to peace
of mind. And even if vengeance isn’t the focal point of living, there would seem to be a
significant amount of negative baggage we carry with us if we were plotting or plotted
revenge (having to deal with the aftermath of revenge). Revenge is obsessive while peace
of mind is undisturbed. A person seeking revenge lives a life lamenting past wrongs and
wasting energy trying to satisfy an insatiable hunger. How would one know if revenge
maximized one’s well-being? Their revenge is not guaranteed to bring them closer to
peace of mind.
One objection to this view is the objection I gave earlier to Butler claiming acting
on revenge is an abuse of resentment and compels one to act irrationally. Exacting
revenge can actually be quite pleasing and it can be done in a very orderly manner. So,
why should I still forswear it? Forswearing revenge presents itself as the simplest way to
achieve peace of mind. Just forswear revenge. Some philosophers may have a problem
with this answer because it is disrespectful to those victims who have suffered
devastating injuries by simply urging them to forgive.63 For example, it is ridiculous to
encourage a Holocaust survivor to forgive the Nazi party; to do so would be a morally
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callous and insolent act. I would have to agree; forswearing revenge isn’t that simple in
these scenarios.
But my second answer to this question is: well then, don’t forswear revenge.
Forgiveness may help one achieve peace of mind but under no circumstances should it be
compelled. Furthermore, I am not saying victims must forgive to achieve peace of mind. I
am saying when victims do forgive victims do so in an effort to maximize their wellbeing. Moral indifference or an appropriate emotional response (non-vengeful
resentment) to a wrongdoing lay outside the boundaries of forgiveness. Non-resentful
responses to wrongdoings lead Kekes takes to argue that the “standard view is mistaken,
therefore, in supposing that the reaction to being wronged must be resentment. The
reaction is blame, and those who have been wronged can reasonably blame wrongdoers
without the danger that this will lead to immorality.”64
At this point I would like to clarify my view on forgiveness. I do not think
resentment must be the reaction to being wronged. However, I do think in order for a
victim to forgive she must first feel resentment towards her offender. Forgiveness is a
remedy that treats resentment. Blame is simply the diagnosis of the symptom; it answers
the questions: who ought to be resented and for what? In other words, we react
maliciously towards offenders because we develop resentment towards them only after
identifying them as responsible for the offense. This is placing the blame, or making the
diagnosis.
I bring this up because our emotional response to a wrong follows blaming
someone for said wrong. It is reasonable to believe this because in order to respond
emotionally to a wrong we need to know who is to blame and if that act was in fact
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wrong. I would not resent A before believing he is the author of the injury inflicted upon
me. Furthermore, I would not resent A if A did not perform towards me “undeserved,
unjustified, and nontrivial harm.”65 I bring up blame and forgiveness because Kekes
claims the two (reasonable blame and forgiveness) are incompatible and I am drawn to
his work because I agree with many of his criticisms on the standard view of forgiveness
(e.g. Konstan’s view).66
I will now offer my account. I argue forgiveness is a unilateral phenomenon that a
victim performs for the sake of maximizing their well-being in response to a specific
moral injury.

1) Sometimes moral agents inflict unwarranted harm on each other.
2) Victims of (1) can react by:
a) Holding the offender responsible for the action and
b) Believing the action of the offender was wrong by making a moral
judgment about it, i.e. blaming them
3) Victims who perform both acts of (2) can come to express emotional
discontent toward the offender in vengeful resentment.
4) Vengeful resentment sustains the moral suffering of the victim’s injury by
reminding her of the injury for the sake of exacting revenge.
5) Sustained moral suffering is contrary to one’s moral well-being
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6) The simplest way to prevent or resolve (5) can be to forswear vengeful
resentment.
7) The victim forgives her offender by choosing to do (6) in acknowledgement
that she is maximizing her moral well-being in response to the specific wrongdoing.

There are a few parts of my account that I wish to explain further. Due to the
imperfect nature of human beings, (1) is very plausible. We see, read about, and hear
about people inflicting unwarranted harm on each other all of the time. Victims often
respond by holding offenders accountable and blaming them for their wrongdoings. This
is what (3) discusses. However, (3) does not hold that a victim must react in these two
ways. As per earlier discussion, victims of wrongdoing can act in moral indifference or
fail to perceive their offenders as culpable etc. But when victims do perform both acts
and come to blame their offenders, victims can develop vengeful resentment towards
their offenders. Unless the victim is a moral saint, or moral a pushover, depending on
one’s take, it is reasonable that the victim will form some type of resentment towards the
offender. Their resentment can come in different degrees. The degree of resentment
results from the ingredients at play, e.g. the degree of the perceived wrongdoing and the
personal emotional toll the injury had on the victim. Ingredients vary for different people.
The point is that blaming alone does not lead to vengeful resentment but it is necessary
for one to have the desire for revenge. If it weren’t, how would one know whom to exact
revenge on and why? Furthermore, vengeful resentment is the resentment that fuels a
desire for revenge. I understand vengeful resentment to be the precursor to an inevitable
act of revenge unless forsworn.
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So let us say that the victim has come to develop vengeful resentment towards
their offender, i.e. the desire for revenge. What is next? The victim can pursue revenge
but then she would no longer be able to forgive her offender. By pursuing revenge the
victim would already have chosen not to forswear revenge. Thus it is then logically
impossible to forgive. However, the victim can choose to forgive her offender by
forswearing vengeful resentment. This would entail entirely abandoning her desire for
revenge. By doing this, the victim willingly chooses to not pursue revenge. Not only does
she willingly choose to not pursue revenge, she does so in order to maximize her moral
well-being in response to the injury she suffered. However, keep in mind one’s overall
well-being may greatly increase as a result of revenge. For example, let us say my father
entitled me to his entire estate and his immense wealth in his will. My father wrongs me
and the ingredients are right where I develop vengeful resentment. I hire a hit man to
fulfill my desire for revenge. This would certainly bring me well-being in the form of
wealth but this would also stain my moral well-being by keeping the unwarranted harm I
suffered in mind and it makes the inherited wealth come with negative moral baggage. As
I will discuss in the next chapter, Caesar practiced mercifulness to increase his overall
well-being but he did not forgive in response to moral wrongdoings for the sake of
maximizing his moral well-being. Hence I will argue he was not a forgiver.
I will take the time now to discuss why I think non-vengeful resentment is
important and why it need not be foresworn altogether to constitute forgiveness. Like
Butler claims, “the good influence which this passion [non-vengeful resentment] has in
fact upon the affairs of the world”67 is that it punishes the offender by making use of the
feelings of indignation about “the fairness of an action or of an intention to do that
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action…and it is a reactive as well as retributive passion that instinctively seeks to exact a
due measure of punishment.”68 We ought to punish wrongdoers for their wrongs simply
because they deserve it. Furthermore, punishment is necessary for our morality as a
community; “morality aims at human well-being by maintaining a system of conventions
in order to come as close as the contingencies of life allow to individuals getting what
they deserve and not getting what they do not deserve.”69 So I try to make room for
punishment (interpersonal private punishment, not legal punishment by the state) into my
account of forgiveness by claiming interpersonal punishment can derive form nonvengeful resentment. Whether or not wrongdoers are punished by the state is outside
interpersonal punishment. Non-vengeful resentment enables the victim to punish the
offender appropriately, in a moral, proportionate way. For example, I may give the
offender the ‘cold shoulder’ when I see her to express my moral contempt with her.
One may point out that pursuing interpersonal punishment as just noted above
seems very much like sustaining suffering from an injury and thus contradicts maximizes
one’s moral well-being. In fact punishment of this sort sounds like “someone who claims
to have forgiven – excepting perhaps the letting go of lingering resentment – but then
keeps reminding the offender of her misdeeds. This is a form of manipulation, even
humiliation. Forgiveness would then have metamorphosed into an instrument of revenge;
yet forgiveness is, in part, the forswearing of revenge. The same is a fortiori true of the
incompatibility between such behavior and accomplished forgiveness.”70 Despite this
observation, there is an important distinction to make between the sustained suffering of
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an injury through revenge and the sustained suffering of an injury through non-vengeful
punishment. It seems difficult to believe the latter is sustained suffering in that
compromises one’s peace of mind. Revenge has an intensity that punishing an offender in
the aforementioned way lacks. Furthermore, punishing a wrongdoer through nonvengeful resentment testifies to the milder degree of the wrong, i.e. did the victim really
suffer to begin with?
Nonetheless, this issue raises an important question: how bad do we want to
punish our wrongdoer? If we answer with positively then we will make exceptions and
‘harass’ the offender on occasion for the sake of punishing. If we answer negatively, then
interpersonal punishment cannot coexist with forgiveness. But like I discussed earlier,
punishment is the glue to our moral system; when the state or other third-parties do not
punish wrongdoers it is left up to the victim to carry it out. But the victim is stuck in a
difficult dilemma if they also wish to seek forgiveness. This issue also underscores an
important distinction to make. Does the forgiver insist on punishment after he or she
forswears vengeful resentment rather than punishing herself? In other words, is the nonvengeful resentment after forgiveness actually the desire to see the offender punished?
Punishment is vital to supporting our system of morals. Victims can forgive or
punish their offenders. By punishing offenders, victims contribute to supporting our
system of morals. In forgiving they leave punishing their offenders up to the state, some
third party or no one at all. It is reasonable to believe cases, and many of them, exist
where punishment is left to the third option. Is this what we really want? Probably not,
but my account makes it difficult to reconcile punishment via ill feelings and forgiveness.
Thus, I am inclined to tweak my account and say non-vengeful resentment manifests
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itself in the desire to see the wrong go punished but isn’t punishment per se. It seems like
I cannot have my cake and eat it too.
Let us return to the victim’s well-being. It is not in the victim’s well-being to
sustain his or her suffering (from his or her injury). Vengeful resentment makes the
victim focused on exacting a type of immoral punishment although it may be justified.
For example, an enraged husband can go after and kill the homeless villainous man on
the street for mugging his wife on her way home from work. I would consider that
justified yet immoral. Vengeful resentment is somewhat of a broken record player,
replaying the injury for the victim. Sustaining unnecessary suffering is contrary to
maximizing our well-being. The most reasonable way to solve this dilemma of revenge is
to forswear it.71
One may have already criticized my explanation of forgiveness as too simplistic,
lackluster and overly self-interested, diminishing the value of forgiveness for what it
ought to represent. In other words, we like to think of forgiveness as a moral
rehabilitative project between individuals- we get a warm, fuzzy feeling that forgiveness
is a morally beautiful thing when it manifests itself in the paradigm view. My critics are
correct but I want to make something clear. Forgiveness is as complicated as we make
it.72 It would be wonderful if forgiveness actually grounded itself in the ideal form but it
need not. Furthermore, paradigm forgiveness is more complicated to achieve. However,
this is not to claim paradigm forgiveness does not occur between victims and their
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offenders. Instead, we too comfortably get used to the idea that this is the way
forgiveness is but this is mistaken. And I think Konstan makes this mistake too. Thus, we
should take forgiveness for what it is in its basic function for moral agents and simply
appreciate when more is accomplished.
I advocate for a morally pragmatic approach to understanding forgiveness.
Forgiveness is the act of forswearing vengeful resentment to maximize one’s moral wellbeing after suffering a moral injury. However, there are numerous reasons one may have
to forgive and these reasons do not necessarily pertain to maximizing one’s well-being in
response to suffering a moral injury. I would say these reasons are not genuine
forgiveness. The boyfriend who forgives his unfaithful girlfriend just to ‘get back’ with
her because he misses their sexual relationship isn’t forgiving his girlfriend. He is making
room for the suffering he has endured by fabricating a veil of forgiveness, which falsely
reestablishes the status quo of their relationship. With this being said, my account of
forgiveness is strict.
Paradigm forgiveness is more difficult to achieve by virtue of it having more steps
and conditions to meet. It seems contrary for humans to choose paradigm forgiveness
when they can choose a simpler method. It is complex in that both the victim and
offender must meet required conditions and communicate their success to the other for
forgiveness to occur. For this reason, I think it is overly ambitious to think of forgiveness
as a dyadic relationship involving a change of heart for both parties.73 Furthermore, it is
still unclear why forgiveness needs to be communicated to the offender. I forgive X for
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Y. I willingly cease resentment towards X and abstain from exacting revenge so I can
have peace of mind after the wrong I endured. Why does the offender need to know this?
Under the paradigm perspective we may say this communicative component is
essential for the wrongdoer to complete his or her change of heart. However, that is the
case only if we understand forgiveness as a bilateral process for the victim and
wrongdoer. But isn’t forgiveness an act for the victim alone? Isn’t it more reasonable that
forgiveness is an act performed by the victim, for the victim in order to maximize her
moral well-being after suffering an injury? Griswold and other defenders of the paradigm
account may disagree with this point because if the offender fulfills his/her respective
conditions, “forgiveness is commendable because it is what the offender is due”
(Forgiveness, 69). It would be a woeful mistake for us to believe the offender is due
forgiveness. It simply doesn’t follow that the offender ought to be forgiven upon
fulfilling conditions of repentance. And by saying the offender is due something makes it
seem like the victim may do wrong in not forgiving the offender after the conditions are
met. However, let’s remember who the real offender is. The offender should do things
like repent regardless. The offender was in good standing in a moral community before
her wrongdoing and needs to somehow earn her standing back.
So far I have suggested forgiveness need not be defined in the paradigmatic sense.
Forgiveness is the moral phenomenon by a victim to maximize her moral well-being after
suffering a moral injury. When we stipulate more conditions for such a grandiose notion
of forgiveness we lose sight of this simple function. I hope this discussion on forgiveness
has better defined what kind of moral phenomenon we actually deal with in our daily
lives and how we ought to proceed in understanding it. The preconditions for forgiveness
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are basically indisputable. A moral agent must be blameworthy for an offense towards a
victim. The victim must perceive their alleged offender to be blameworthy for the
inflicted injury. Also, there cannot be any mitigating circumstances precluding
responsibility or warranting excuse or other types of dismissal. And while emotion need
not be necessary in the moral reaction to a wrong, individuals who feel resentment in
response to moral wrongdoing are the ones capable of forgiving.
We have seen two genres of accounts that tend to conflict on very core levels. The
unconditional account proposes forgiveness is a unilateral moral phenomenon that
forswears revenge with the possibility of having forgiveness communicated. The
paradigm account proposes forgiveness is a bilateral moral phenomenon that
communicates a change of heart between the offender and victim. In addition, I have
offered an explanation to why individuals forgive and on whom the responsibility of
forgiving falls.
Some may consider my account to be an instance of “imperfect” forgiveness.74
This type of forgiveness is non-paradigm but still meets the “threshold conditions for
forgiveness.” These conditions include: the willingness of the victim to lower her pitch of
resentment and forswear revenge, the willingness of the offender to qualify for
forgiveness, and that the injury humanly possible to forgive.75 To reiterate Griswold’s
point: “only when all three [conditions] are met does forgiveness come off at all
(Forgiveness, 115).” This is what I have been arguing against. The bulk of my argument
attacks the second condition because it is unnecessary and ungrounded. The better way to
understand forgiveness is as an intrapersonal, unconditional moral phenomenon. I think I
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provide a better reason for conceiving forgiveness as an intrapersonal moral phenomenon
by the victim, for the victim. Victims forgive to maximize their well-being in response to
the injury they suffered, not for an overall change in moral attitude towards the
wrongdoer. Furthermore, the repentance of the offender post factum should not change
the resentment felt by the victim in response to the specific wrongdoing; however, it may
affect their moral attitude towards the offender as a whole.76 The victim chooses how to
deal with her resentment independent of the wrongdoer’s actions.
Another issue with my account may be the following: it lacks the change of heart
we find intuitively praiseworthy and beautiful. First off, since my account disregards the
offender, her change of heart is moot. Second, the victim, in choosing to forswear
vengeful resentment, certainly has a change of heart. The victim chooses to not do
anything immoral to the offender by exacting revenge. While this is not the morally
beautiful act of forgiveness we would like to see, the victim still undergoes a change of
heart in recognizing the offender as an agent to whom immoral revenge should not be
directed. Furthermore, why does the change of heart in forgiveness need to be beautiful?
Does telling ourselves forgiveness is intrinsically beautiful in its own right help wipe
away the ‘ugliness’ in our world? We can tell ourselves it does as much as we want but at
the end of the day forgiveness is best thought of as the unilateral moral phenomenon
victims exercise in order to maximize their moral well-being after suffering a moral
wronging.
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I hope to have established a plausible, compelling account of contemporary
forgiveness. Now I would like to begin analyzing forgiveness in ancient Rome. The
conclusions that follow are greatly influenced by account just given. Julius Caesar is the
next topic for discussion. Caesar is a unique case for studying clementia because he
devastated many tribes in the Gallic Wars, relentlessly challenged his political rivals in
Rome yet coveted the persona of clementia Caesaris. When I examine clementia
Caesaris I will search for evidence that meets 1) the preconditions for contemporary
forgiveness and 2) my account of forgiveness. I will discuss other accounts along the
way. So the question is, did Julius Caesar forgive as we do today?
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PERNICIOUS POLITICS: AN EXAMINATION OF JULIUS CAESAR’S CLEMENCY
meus vero discipulus qui hodie apud me cenat valde amat illum quem
Brutus noster sauciavat. et si quaeris (perspexi enim plane), timent
otium;… autem hanc habent eamque prae se ferunt, clarissimum <virum>
interfectum, totam rem publicam illius interitu perturbatam, irrita fore
quae ille egisset simul ac desiste<re>mus timere, clementiam illi malo
fuisse, qua si usus non esset, nihil ei tale accidere potuisse.77
Clementia Caesaris is arguably one of the most influential maxims from Roman
antiquity because of the impact it had on Rome during the Republic and the imprint it left
on Roman politics for years to come. As Plutarch notes, Caesar’s clemency moved the
Roman people to great lengths, enough for them to dedicate a temple of Clemency to him
and (Caes. 57.1, App. CW. 2.106) circulate coinage depicting this honor (RRC
no.480.21). However, even though Caesar’s character was defined by his clemency, “it is
commonly supposed that Julius Caesar’s celebrated clemency toward his fellow citizens
was perceived by his contemporaries not as a virtue, but rather as a manifestation of his
tyrannical power.”78 Many of Caesar’s contemporaries considered his clemency
analogous to “rubbing salt in the wounds of his defeated enemies.”79 As the opening
quote describes, arguably his clemency brought upon his demise.
Nonetheless Caesar had a profound impact on Roman politics by taking the
common act of granting clemency in Roman public law (Dowling, CC, 16-18) and
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elevating the “restraint on clemency to the status of a policy.”80 Furthermore, clementia
Caesaris as a political tool became the subject of panegyric expression (Cic. Pro Marc.
Pro. Deiot. passim, and Ad fam. 15.15.2). In a Caesarian letter Cicero writes: O
clementiam admirabilem atque omnium laude, praedicatione, litteris monumentisque
decorandam! (Pro. Lig. 2.6).81 Perhaps Cicero was able to speak so effectively about
clemency because he had already studied the topic. Some of Cicero’s work earlier in his
career (De Inv. 2.164) suggests this: eius [temperantia] partes continentia, clementia,
modestia… clementia, per quam animi timere in odium alicuius inferioris concitati
comitate retinentur.”82 Clementia attracted Roman bluebloods as it became important
during the Gallic and Civil Wars.
At first glance we may begin to think clementia has an interpersonal moral
undertone similar to paradigm forgiveness since it was used in sparing senators from
prosecution (the case of Quintus Ligurius noted). But in order to grasp the full potential
of clementia, I will analyze Caesar’s work and what his contemporaries had to say about
them. Understanding Caesar’s clemency is fascinating because it evoked reverence from
the Roman people and provoked animosity from the Senate yet it was mostly targeted
toward his aristocratic peers. The aim of this chapter is to grasp an understanding of
clementia Caesaris in the Roman Republic and decide whether or not clementia in this
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context of ancient Rome reflects contemporary forgiveness. I hope to convince the reader
that textual evidence does not illustrate Caesar practicing contemporary forgiveness.83
Let us begin with what Caesar had to say about himself in De Bello Gallico.
Caesar recounts his first act of clemency when the Gallic leader Diviciacus begs for it.
Speaking for the Bellovaci and the Aeudi, Diviciacus urges Caesar to ut sua clementia ac
mansuetudine in eos utatur (BG 2.14.5).84 Caesar accepted this plea on the condition that
his sescentos obsides poposcit be satisfied (BG 2.15.1); such demands were met. Here we
see an act of transactional clemency after a battle; to the victor (Caesar) went hostages
and weapons and to the loser went protection under Caesar’s rule. This is an act of
economic clemency since Caesar spares the lives of the Gallic people yet takes hostages
and strips them of their weapons, rendering them vulnerable to neighboring Gallic
territories. Had it been pure clemency, he would have let them go without concessions.
His act of mercy derives from Caesar honoris Diviciaci atque Aeduorum causa (BG
2.15.1).85 It would also be hard to claim Diviciacus earned clemency for his tribe; Caesar
merely regards the practice of clementia as a standard “expression of a man’s virtus on
the battlefield.”86 In this example we see a mutual recognition of respect, despite the
inferior status of one (the loser), and granted clemency as a condition of post-battle
negotiations.
It would be hard to argue that this is a case of forgiveness, regardless of how one
wants to look at it. In Butler’s view, it would have to satisfy the notion of forswearing
revenge. Some may say the Gauls were guilty of an immoral act, waging war on the
83

I am studying Caesar to answer this question because there is a substantial amount of work on him
claiming he did forgive others throughout his life.
84
“beseech you to show your mercy and kindness towards them.”
85
“the respect he had toward Diviciacus and the Aedui.”
86
Dowling, Clemency, 17.

44

Romans, and thus Caesar probably felt resentment, even a desire for revenge in
response.87 First, we do not have any textual evidence that Caesar felt this way and it is
more plausible that Caesar considered the engagement with this Gallic tribe just like any
other day of fighting a war. Hence, I find it difficult to believe he felt ‘wronged’ and
resented the Gauls. Second, the Gallic Wars were fought in Gaul. If anything, Caesar
wronged them by invading their territory seeking dignitas and military glory.88 So I say
this was not an instance of forswearing revenge because there was no initial moral wrong.
Furthermore, it does not fall under the unconditional or my own account of forgiveness.89
This example also fails the paradigm account. The paradigm account’s basic
conditions are: 1) the victim must acknowledge the wrong done by believing in it
occurring 2) the offender needs to acknowledge their wrong done through a change of
heart and 3) both parties share a change in perspective of the other.90 Let us assume the
Gauls have committed the wrong of waging war on Caesar. Diviciacus addresses Caesar
as repenting his wrong. He begs Caesar to show mercy on his people because he knows
what will come of his people’s fate if he does not. Let us also assume Diviciacus is not
only illustrating regret but remorse. Let us also assume the remorse is genuine and it is
well communicated to Caesar. So it seems that both parties acknowledge the wrong done
and now are seeking reparations. But do they wish a change of heart in the matter?
Regardless of how one looks at it, Caesar has not been wronged in the sense that
Diviciacus committed some moral wrong towards him. And thus no change of heart or
87
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perception (of each other) is warranted. My point is that Caesar could not have used
clementia as a moral remedy because he did not suffer a moral injury.
The next tribe Caesar encounters meets a most unfortunate end. The Aduatuci
sent deputies to Caesar for peace; Caesar writes: si forte pro sua clementia ac
mansuetudine, quam ipsi ab aliis audirent, statuisset Aduatucos esse conservandos, ne se
armis despoliaret (BG 2.31.4).91 Had he taken their arms the Aduatuci would become
vulnerable to the vengeful locals. In short, they would not be able to defend themselves.
So, Caesar responds: se magis consuetudine sua quam merito eorum civitatem
conservatum… sed deditionis nullam esse condicionem nisi armis traditis…quod Nerviis
fecisset facturum finitimisque imperaturum ne quam dediticiis populi Romani iniuriam
inferrant (BG 2.32.1); then the Aduatuci surrendered most arms.92 However they sneakily
preserve some arms and attack Caesar’s forces the next night. The Aduatuci are defeated
in a brief battle and fifty-three thousand persons are sold into slavery (BG 2.33.6). We see
Caesar, once again, opening peace talks with his enemy by allowing them to surrender
their arms for clemency. When peace talks fail he punishes them by selling them into
slavery.
It is at best unclear how we would begin arguing this example as indicative of
forgiveness. This example seems to exclude a crucial component: a genuine moral
transgression. Again, I think it is wrong to believe Caesar felt morally wronged especially
since this engagement occurred under the circumstances of war. However, let us assume
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Caesar did wish to exact revenge on the Aduatuci for their surprise attack (this act of
betrayal ‘wronged’ Caesar). I find it hard to believe selling fifty-three thousand people
into slavery is an act of forswearing revenge or punishment.93
Caesar’s reflection on the rebellion led by Vercingetorix, at Uxellodunum in 51
B.C. (Coulter, Caesar, 518) also mentions his clemency. Caesar knew severity might be
necessary to quell this rebellion. However, he felt this wouldn’t jeopardize his
reputation.94 Confident in his reputation as a merciful commander, Caesar was not
reluctant to punish his enemies in the following fashion: itaque omnibus qui arma
tulerant manus precidit vitamque concessit, quo testatior esset poena improborum (BG
8.44.2).95 Clementia Caesaris clearly does not come into play here. However we do see
clementia’s far-reaching influence among Caesar’s contemporaries.96 The fact that he
allegedly did such a cruel thing and was still considered merciful attests to the success
Caesar had in constructing clementia to his wartime persona. What else can we say about
these incidents during the Gallic Wars?
We can say they were acts of forgiveness but not the kind this paper is concerned
with. M.B. Dowling asserts there is a central component in clemency that “it must be
earned by the suppliant and not solely through the act of supplication itself” (Clemency,
19). Like some contemporary accounts of forgiveness (i.e. the paradigm view) we get the
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Keep in mind, these numbers may not be entirely accurate.
Caes. BG. 8.44.1: Caesar, cum suam lenitatem cognitam omnibus sciret neque vereretur ne quid
crudelitate naturae videretur asperius fecisse…. or “Caesar’s clemency, as he knew, was familiar to all,
and he did not fear that severer action on his part might seem due to natural cruelty.”
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He “cut off the hands of all who had borne arms, to testify more openly the penalty for wrongdoers.” It is
important to note that Caesar did not write Book VIII of De Bello Gallico. This could be why we read
about such a detailed, ruthless act of punishment contrary to clementia Caesaris. In his previous books,
Caesar more or less may have crafted his words in favor of bolstering his reputation with the Romans.
However, just because we hear less detailed accounts of brutality and violence doesn’t mean such incidents
didn’t exist.
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Really, we see how Caesar believes his reputation has taken shape among his contemporaries (he is the
author). Perhaps, he is mistaken.
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sense that clementia is a phenomenon that occurs between two agents. However,
clementia in ancient Rome marked one agent as the superior punisher in the right and the
other agent as the inferior wrongdoer (Konstan, Virtue, 339). And if we were to draw a
parallel line to modern forgiveness we may say the victim is superior to their offender. In
other words, doing wrong to another de facto diminishes the offender’s moral status. This
dynamic of the relationship acknowledges what we have discussed so far as supplication
and I think this is rightly so.97 Moral reason grounds forgiveness. Political advantage
grounds supplication. Caesar’s acts during the Gallic Wars were for political advantage.
And as far as the evidence shows, they lacked moral motivation too.
The examples of clementia in Bellico Gallico illustrate this act as political
forgiveness at best, like pardon used in modern times by the President. It is a mistake to
think these were acts of moral forgiveness. The aforementioned cases exhibit a
warmonger in the skin of a man, who when necessary used brute military force to
accomplish his tasks for the sake of glory and political gain. When he didn’t harshly
punish defeated enemies he subdued them with mercy. His clemency proved as powerful
a tool than any sword. Placated tribes would more likely adhere to his rule rather than
face annihilation (Coulter, Caesar, 523). Caesar was relentless in his pursuits; it just so
happen to be that he did not always have to resort to bloodshed to achieve them; and this
does not make him a forgiver, at least in the Gallic Wars. Evidence from the Civil Wars
suggests little else.
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Konstan (BF, 13) describes this process as follows: first the suppliant must approach the
supplicand…second, the suppliant is expected to make certain gestures or verbal appeals… third, the
suppliant makes a case for deserving a positive response from the supplicand… finally, the supplicand
evaluates the plea and decides whether or not to honor it… but clemency in these situations is not so much
forgiveness as gentleness or mildness: the person in a position of power lets the offender or offenders off as
a special grant of generosity …in the way that Caesar… did with many of his opponents.”
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As we have seen, clementia Caesaris during the Gallic Wars was primarily
motivated by political desire thru a military stratagem. It lacked the moral significance
essential to forgiveness. But when we turn to look at clementia Caesaris in the Civil War
from 49-45 B.C. we read about Caesar’s clemency in a new light; a light that illuminates
Caesar with his fellow Romans, not the menacing tribes of Gaul. Perhaps we would see a
more humane Caesar who was driven by morals when dealing with his fellow Roman
statesman. It seems nice to think Caesar did forgive his political enemies, former
comrades and allies. But Roman politics was pernicious politics, especially the way
Caesar played.
Caesar neglected to comment on his clemency throughout the Civil Wars in the
similar fashion to the Gallic Wars.98 However, this doesn’t mean he wasn’t merciful; in
fact, Caesar’s clemency was the topic of aristocrat discussion; for some, it was the topic
of praise. For example, Cicero delivers a moving speech to the Senate in 46 B.C.
regarding one of his friends whom Caesar is aiming to prosecute from the Civil War.
Cicero claims he had to reemerge into politics because Caesar’s clemency was too great
of a cause not to: tantam enim mansuetudinem, tam inusitatam inauditamque clementiam,
tantum in summa potestate rerum omnium modum, tam denique incrediblem sapientam
ac paene divinam tacitus praeterire nullo modo possum (Pro Marc. 1).99 We can better
understand the political context of this quote if we consider the relationship between
Caesar and Cicero as the Civil War was concluding. Will Durant writes:
To Cicero, who had trimmed his wind to every sale, he [Caesar] offered
not only pardon but honor, and refused nothing that the orator asked for
98

Griffin, CAC, 160.
“For such humanity, such exceptional, nay, unheard-of clemency, such invariable moderation exhibited
by one who has attained supreme power, such incredible and almost superhuman loftiness of mind I find it
impossible to pass by in silence.”
99
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himself or his Pompeian friends; he even forgave, at Cicero’s urging, the
unrepentant Marcus Marcellus. In a pretty speech… Cicero acclaimed
Caesar’s ‘unbelievable liberality,’ and admitted that Pompey, victorious,
would have been more vengeful.100
Griffin gives us further insight to this example writing that “it was demonstrably the
situation, not the word, that men like Marcus Marcellus and Cato resented, the situation
in which Caesar had acquired power over his equals by civil war and clearly intended to
keep that power for some time afterwards” (CAC, 160). So what do we make of this?
Let us assume Marcellus was blameworthy for his wrongdoing and all
preconditions are met in this situation. Caesar’s act does not fit the paradigm account
because Marcellus did not repent, hence violating the second condition. Does Caesar’s
clemency satisfy the unconditional account or my own? Cicero had to persuade Caesar to
grant Marcellus clemency. Caesar thus forgave Marcellus because of Cicero, not because
he chose to forswear revenge or keep his well-being in mind. Furthermore, sparing
Marcellus meant keeping another one of Caesar’s political enemies alive and able to
conspire against him. It was contrary to his well-being. For these reasons, it is difficult to
believe Caesar actually forgave Marcellus. Cicero claimed the Roman people were huius
insidiosa clementia delectantur (Ad Att. 8.16.2), or “delighted with his [Caesar’s] artful
clemency.”101 However, some, like Cicero, probably knew better to buy whole-heartedly
in to it and how to use it.102
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Christ, 195.
Konstan (Virtue, 337) translates this as “treacherous clemency,” which offers a different perspective on
what Cicero means. Dowling (Clemency, 23) writes: “the clemency of Caesar had a real attraction but was
regarded with distrust.”
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In two other letters to Marcellus (Ad fam. 4.7.3 and 4.9.4) Cicero describes this event without using the
word clementia. Perhaps Cicero used the word in the presence of Caesar, playing up clementia as a
persuasive device. Cicero (Ad. Att.1, 9.16.1) also once wrote: recte auguraris de me… nihil a me abesse
longius crudelitate…nihil ehim malo quam et me mei simile esse et illos sui. “Caesar detests cruelty and
nothing is more pleasing to him than being true to his nature.” Just some food for thought, Caesar (Ad Att.2,
101
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Caesar utilized clemency as an effective weapon during his conflict with Pompey.
He claims to have treated the soldiers of Pompey’s army kindly, ordering his own men to
see to their needs. He even acknowledged any defector’s previous ranks held under
Pompey in his own army (BC.1.77). When Caesar arrives in Alexandria he learns
Pompey has been killed. While in tears for his fellow Roman, he promises to spare the
lives of Pompeians out of honor (Plut. Caes. 48). To what extent he felt remorse for the
state of affairs that led to Pompey’s death is arguable. Durant writes: “Caesar turned
away at horror [from the sight of Pompey’s severed head] and wept at this new proof that
by diverse means men come to the same end (Christ, 186). Perhaps Caesar’s performance
was aimed to build on the clementia Caesaris persona. Nonetheless, in Cicero’s
correspondence with Atticus, Caesar’s letter to Oppius and Cornelius illustrates his
interest in granting clemency to his enemies (the Pompeians) at the onset of the Civil War
in contrast to Sulla’s cruel policies a generation prior.103 So perhaps the decision to
pardon Pompey’s followers after hearing upon his death serves the same political
strategy. I think the textual evidence only suggests this. It would be speculation to say
Caesar felt remorse, decided to forgive Pompey and show it by forgiving his men too.
But why did Caesar weep? I think he wept because Pompey was an honorable man who
met a dishonorable death.104

14.1) once wrote to a friend: “He [Cicero] is the most easygoing of mankind, but I don’t doubt he detests
me.”
103
Cic. Ad Att.1, 9.7C: temptemus hoc modo si possimus omnium voluntates recuperare et diuturna victoria
uti, quoniam reliqui crudelitate odium effugere non potuerunt neque victoria ditius tenere praeter unum L.
Sullam, quem imitaturus non sum. haec novus sit ratio vincendi ut miseracordia et liberalitate nos
muniamus. This was either a clever strategy on Caesar’s part or very convenient as Dowling (Clemency,
20-4) writes this shift [showing clementia to fellow citizens] was effective in the context of Sulla’s
proscriptions and unprecedented cruelty a generation prior.
104
Durant writes “The general [Pompey] was stabbed to death as he stepped upon the shore [of
Alexandria], while his wife looked on in helpless terror from the ship in which they had come” (Christ,
186).
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Bellum Alexandrinum presents more evidence against Caesar practicing
forgiveness. In this book, the King of Lesser Armenia appears before the Senate (Caesar
in attendance) for supplication, begging ut sibi ignosceret (67.1) because he was coerced
to fight on the side of Pompey. After deliberation, Caesar grants him clemency. This
example is nearly identical to the cases in the Gallic Wars. These were is act of nonmoral forgiveness (e.g. pardon). These acts are translated differently, with the same
general meaning.105 So in our analysis of clementia Caesaris in the context of war
forgiveness turns out best understood as a pardon.106
As I have shown, we do not have substantial textual evidence to argue Caesar
practiced moral forgiveness. Additionally, we often have to speculate. These texts do not
elaborate on the specific feelings of resentment, revenge and repentance for the
characters in the commentaries. These are things we need to know to make better
judgments about whether or not they practiced forgiveness. For example, we simply do
not know if Caesar truly felt remorse upon hearing Pompey’s death. It is plausible to
think he sought to forswear revenge on his political adversaries, like Pompey, but to
believe his actions were not politically motivated is to not understand Caesar’s
character.107
One thing we can confirm is Caesar’s role in clementia’s conceptual
transformation.108 He took a common concept and molded it to the shape of Roman
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Konstan, BF, 55: “In war, ignoscere is sometimes more or less equivalent to showing ‘clemency’
(clementia), humaneness (humanitas), or pity (misericordia).”
106
Griswold, Forgiveness, 13.
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Dowling (Clemency, 27) writes: “Clemency in Roman thought was the deliberate forgiveness of a
punishment that was deserved, a leniency in which the strict requirements of justice were put aside for
reasons of humanity or political advantage. Cicero believed that the clemency that Caesar advertised sprang
from the latter motivation… We do not know what motivations Caesar privately acknowledged himself…”
108
Braund writes (Clementia, 34-36) writes that he made three crucial shifts. First, he established clementia
as a “personal benefaction rather than a benefaction of the Roman state.” Second, Caesar demonstrated
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politics as he saw fit. By granting clementia to his enemies during the Civil War he won
the hearts of the people yet cultivated an unknown hostility against him by the Roman
Senate. Clementia Caesaris became an unprecedented technique in solidifying power in
Roman affairs; it was propaganda.109 Clemency started as virtue of the Roman state
practiced by generals but then it moved to the political arena. So far I have discussed
negative findings on whether or not contemporary forgiveness materialized in Caesar’s
practice of clementia. The examples of clementia Caesaris above fall short of forgiveness
for a variety of reasons: Caesar was never morally injured, if he was morally injured he
neglected a change of heart (in the paradigm sense), clementia Caesaris was utilized as a
means for supplicating enemies, and clemency bound the pardoner and pardoned to a
hierarchal relationship for life (a type of patron-client relationship), which is contrary to
the point of paradigm forgiveness.110 However, I have yet to really test my account.
My account of forgiveness is intrapersonal and need not be communicative. It
calls for foreswearing revenge at one’s wrongdoer for the sake of maximizing one’s wellbeing with respect to the injury suffered. I have already established why Caesar did not
practice forgiveness during the Gallic Wars. There were no moral, interpersonal
transgressions. The Gallic Wars were motivated by Caesar’s quest for dignitas and
upward mobility in the political arena. In defending their land, the Gauls should not be
seen as wrongdoers. The burden of attack was on Caesar once he crossed into their
territory. One may say that Caesar, like other Romans, felt morally injured from previous
clementia to his fellow Roman citizens, marking, thus, the move into the political sphere. Third, Caesar
managed to elevate clementia from the human domain to the divine, establishing what we refer to today as
clementia Caesaris.
109
Dowling, Clemency, 24-26.
110
Dowling (Clemency, 17) writes: “The donation of clemency implied the superiority of the donor and the
willing subjugation of the recipient [for life].” Cf. Griswold’s fifth step in the paradigm account. Basically,
the victim does not seek moral superiority over the forgiven offender.
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attacks the Gauls made on Rome (e.g. the sack of Rome in 390 B.C.) and thus the Gauls
should be held in moral contempt. First, if this were in any case true, the Gallic Wars
would still be an act of revenge. In the end, the extent of Caesar’s involvement north of
Italy depended on his dream coming true, conquering all of Gaul (Durant, Christ, 175).
The closest Caesarian act to forgiveness (under my account) is his proclamation
of clemency to the Pompeians following Pompey’s death in Alexandria (Plut. Caes. 48).
Plutarch’s description of Caesar’s reaction may encourage us to consider Caesar’s
clemency toward the Pompeians as modern forgiveness because it has moral significance.
As noted earlier, it is hard to believe Caesar would shed tears, or be portrayed as
shedding tears, if the situation had no moral bearing on him whatsoever. If we assume
Caesar blamed Pompey for certain offenses throughout the war it is reasonable to believe
Caesar felt some type of resentment towards him through the civil struggle.
Did Caesar feel vengeful resentment toward Pompey and his men from battling
against them? Caesar’s De Bello Civile does not provide us with any indication as to
what kind of emotional, moral response Caesar had to Pompey during the war or even if
he felt resentment at all. Furthermore, we do not even know their reactive attitudes
toward each other. Caesar is the only authority on their personal correspondence.111
Perhaps Caesar saw his struggle with Pompey as a necessary evil amidst war.112 We can
at best guess how Caesar felt but, in addition to the textual evidence we have, it is more
reasonable to think Caesar felt appropriate resentment towards Pompey. The war wasn’t
personal; it was a matter of saving Rome during civil strife and that was anyone’s taking.

111

Durant, Christ, 185.
Ibid., 180-181: “he [Caesar] did not relish a war against his fellow citizens and his former friends. But
he saw the snares that had ben prepared for him, and resented them as an ill-reward for one who saved Italy
[from the death of the Republic].”
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Clementia Caesaris was contemporary forgiveness. I have discussed reasons why
all accounts of forgiveness fail to capture it. Despite clementia being regarded as a virtue
and an indication of mild temperament (Konstan, Virtue, 337), clementia was deployed to
push a self-interested political agenda. Caesar narrates De Bello Gallico and De Bello
Civile for the Roman people in an attempt to promote himself as a kind, generous
political figure. It should be no surprise that he writes of sparing his enemies, promising
their well-being and providing Rome with stability and security. We are analyzing
clementia in the context of war and political struggle, which makes our exploration
difficult; modern forgiveness, regardless if one wishes to accept my account, is a
phenomenon that occurs between interactions on a personal level.
But perhaps we are limited in our conclusions because we do not know how
Caesar truly thought about his acts of clemency. For example, in his own mind he could
have been thinking his clemency towards the Pomepey’s men following his death was
indeed forgiveness in some way. This raises an important issue. The ancient texts we
analyze offer limited perspectives. While these perspectives portray Caesar as an
unforgiving man, perhaps he thought he was a very forgiving man. However I think
regardless of what Caesar thought he was not practicing forgiveness as a moral remedy to
a moral wrongdoing. He certainly increased his well-being by granting clemency
throughout his career, e.g. he accumulated a tremendous amount of wealth and form a
cohesive clientele system, but he did not seek moral rehabilitation from moral wrongs his
opponents aimed at him. Nonetheless, this is what I think the textual evidence suggests.
Caesar marked the beginning of clementia’s transformation. Braund (Clementia,
33) writes from this point in time clementia begins to expand “its field as Republic
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becomes Principate, from the military sphere into the political sphere, and later in the
empire into the ethical sphere, where it shapes the early Christian concept of mercy that
persists to our own time.” Durant sums up the infantile steps of clementia’s growth under
Caesar’s wing:
He had forgiven all surrendering foes and had condemned to death only a
few officers who, defeated and pardoned, had fought against him again.
He had burned the unread correspondence he had found in the tents of
Pompey and Scipio. He had sent the captured daughter and grandchildren
of Pompey to Pompey’s son, Sextus, who was still in arms against him;
and he had restored the statues of Pompey which his followers had thrown
down…He bore silently a thousand slanders, and instituted no proceedings
against those whom he suspected of plotting against his life.113
This was the man whom I argue did not forgive. After Caesar’s death in 44 B.C.
clementia was used less frequently until “only toward the end of the reign of Augustus
that the leader of the Roman state begins consistently to advertise his clementia as proof
of the quality of his rule.”114 Clementia became the epitome of the ruler, the next subject
of exploration: Lucius Annaeus Seneca’s writing on clementia during the reign of Nero.
The question remains, did contemporary forgiveness exist in ancient Rome? In Caesarian
practice it did not, but what about in Seneca’s philosophy?
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Christ, 194-195.
Dowling, Clemency, 28.
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FORETOLD FORGIVENESS: AN EXAMINATION OF CLEMENCY UNDER
LUCIUS ANNAEUS SENECA
Interim, dum trahimus, dum inter homines sumus, colamus humanitatem.
Non timori cuiquam, non periculo simus detrimenta, iniurias, convicia,
vellicationes contemnamus et magno animo brevia feramus incommode.
Dum respicimus, quod aiunt, versamusque nos, iam mortalias aderit (De
ira 3.4.3).115
Death was upon Romans of all classes during the Roman Empire. Lucius Annaeus
Seneca, Seneca the Younger, identifies the character of his contemporaries as corrupt and
flawed (Mueller, Cruelty, 167). Seneca writes:
We are mad, not only individually, but nationally. We check homicide and
isolated murders; but what of war and the much-vaunted crime of
slaughtering whole peoples? There are no limits to our greed, none to our
cruelty.116
Cruelty was a staple in Roman life. When Nero, at age 16, succeeded the throne in A.D.
54, the way of life would not alter much. At first his rule appeared to promise peace and
comfort but eventually it turned dark, violent and erratic. Perhaps it was his fate to follow
the footsteps of his predecessor Claudius. Seneca, Stoic philosopher and educator of Nero
during his youth, had for some years advised the Emperor and the state (Durant, Christ,
302). After Nero had his mother, Agrippina, assassinated, he was no longer the pawn to a
petticoat government (Scullard, Gracchi, 305), allowing him to rule Rome as he so
desired. Seneca worked to promote Nero to the Roman people, despite ‘tarnish[ing] his
record by condoning the worst of Nero’s crimes, ‘letting much evil pass in order to have
115

“Meanwhile, so long as we draw breath, so long as we live among men, let us cherish humanity. Let us
not cause fear to any man, nor danger; let us scorn losses, wrongs, abuses, and taunts, and let us endure
with heroic mind our short-lived ills. Wile we are looking back, as they say, and turning around,
straightway death will be upon us.”
116
Seneca (Ep. 95.30) writes: non privatim solum sed publice furimus. Homicidia conpescimus et singulas
caedes: quid bella et occisarum gentium gloriosum scelus? Non avaritia, non crudelitas (Mueller, Cruelty,
166).
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the power of doing little good’” (Durant, Christ, 303). Seneca focused on writing
speeches and essays, among other political feats, one of which was De clementia when
Nero was just eighteen.117
Similar to Machiavelli’s The Prince, De clementia was a guideline to imperial
success. Seneca addresses De clementia to Nero in the opening lines: scribo de
clementia… institui, ut quodam modo speculi vice fungerer et te tibi ostenderem
perventurum ad voluptatem maximam omnium (De clem.1, 1.1.).118 Scullard writes
clementia was to contrast Nero’s administration against Claudius’ harsh reign (Gracchi,
305). Despite his attempt to edify Nero’s rule, Nero chose tyrannical violence and
retaliation as his means too achieve his ends as Emperor (Dowling, Clemency, 195). For
example, he brutally persecuted Christians for the terrible fire in A.D. 64 (Scullard,
Gracchi, 310). Meanwhile, feeling disgraced and enslaved to the Emperor, Seneca began
to withdraw from political life but even he could not hide from Nero’s ruthlessness;
Seneca was eventually forced to commit suicide in 65 A.D. by the orders of his obstinate
pupil (Durant, Christ, 303).
De clementia has a three-pronged approach. It critiques proper kingship, it is a
panegyrical publication and it promotes morals.119 Even though the work was addressed
to Nero, Seneca “intended for his work to be accessible to a larger audience” (Dowling,
Clemency, 196). Seneca’s work recognized clementia as a symbol the “good ruler
displays and earns his elevation by [its] exercise…and that exercise of clementia is
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Braund, Clementia, 3.
“I have taken on the task of writing about clemency, Nero Caesar, so I can act as a kind of mirror and
give you a picture of yourself as someone who will attain the greatest pleasure of all.”
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Braund, Clementia, 17-23. For my purpose here, I wish to extract as much insight from the third element
because it better reflects forgiveness in the moral context. However, the other two are also important to
consider.
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acknowledged by the corona civica.”120 As with Caesar, we see this word used for its
political potential.121 However, Seneca guides the discussion on clementia into a
philosophical arena as it prompts discussion on morality. While some other writers have
given thought to clementia in its philosophical dress (Cic. De Inv. 2.164) treatises like
this were uncommon.122
In what follows I discuss Seneca’s theory on clementia. This will entail
understanding clementia for the larger audience Dowling suggests exists and
understanding it differently for Nero the emperor. The latter is similar to clementia
Caesaris (political ‘forgiveness’) so the former will be more significance to this
project.123 Seneca contrasts “the morality of clementia” with the “immortality of cruelty”
to cultivate a holistic ethic of clementia for the Romans.124 As in the previous chapter I
will test this ethic of clementia against the notion of contemporary forgiveness I
developed.
Seneca defines clementia as the following:
temperantia animi in potestate ulciscendi vel lenitas superioris adversus
inferiorem in constituendis poenis. plura proponere tutius est ne una
finitio parum rem comprehendat et, ut ita dicam, formula excidat; itaque
dici potest et inclination animi ad lenitatem in poena exigenda (De clem.1,
2.3.1).
120

The corona civica, civic crown, was at first awarded to the Roman who saved a fellow-citizen’s life in
battle but it eventually became identified with the capacity of the emperor to save other citizens’ lives by
showing mercy and kindness (Braund, Clementia, 44.)
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Keep in mind, a successful rule for Nero meant success for Seneca’s administration. By using clementia
to keep the relations between the Senate and the princeps civil (Seneca was sympathetic to the Senate), the
general outlook on the Empire was positive and this gave people the perception of a better state of affairs,
despite the fact that “the emperor’s autocracy was no less than it had been in the past…” (Scullard,
Gracchi, 306).
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Dowling writes: “it was under Nero that the first philosophy of clemency was described by Seneca”
(Clemency, 169).
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I quote forgiveness because this can just be considered as pardoning and not forgiveness as we come to
understand it in moral theory. However, Griswold discusses political pardon as a “sibling of forgiveness”
(Forgiveness, xviii). One may wish to argue it is still a form of moral forgiveness but for our sake let us
proceed with the difference in the effect of political and moral forgiveness.
124
Dowling, Clemency, 195.
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Clemency is ‘restraint of the mind when it is able to take revenge,’ or ‘the
leniency of the more powerful party towards the weaker in the matter of
setting penalties.’ It is safer to propose several formulations, in case a
single definition is not comprehensive enough, and so to speak, loses its
case. So clemency can also be defined as a tendency of the mind towards
leniency in the matter of exacting punishment (Braund, Clementia, 143).
Unfortunately Seneca does not elaborate much more on the definition but this will
suffice in comparison to contemporary forgiveness. First it is necessary to decide which
interpretation above best suits our purpose. The second version should be dismissed on
the grounds that it reflects clementia Caesaris (forgiveness in the political realm.) It
consists of settling issues like Caesar did; the superior party imposes a lenient penalty on
the defeated enemies and this is typically the case in supplicating defeated enemies or
subordinating political rivals. The first and third versions are more pertinent. The third
emphasizes punishment while the first emphasizes revenge. However, both
interpretations involve the ‘restraint’ or ‘leniency’ to moderate their reactions
(punishment and revenge, respectively). I take the verbs to be synonymous since they
both involve reducing resentment to prevent exercising extreme, or unnecessarily more
intense, retaliatory action on the offender.
Seneca also distinguishes clementia from quasi-synonyms and its antonyms.
Braund organizes these distinctions nicely: “clementia is not the same as misericordia
(see De clem. 2.4.4-2.6.4 n.) or mansuetudo (see 1.7.3 n.) or moderatio (see 1.2.2 n.) or
indulgentia or lenitas (see 2.3.1 n.) or comitas. The actions denoted by venia (see 2.7,
2.7.1, 2.7.3 nn.) and parcere (see 1.1.4, 1.5.1, 2.7.2 nn.) and ignoscere (see 2.7, 2.7.3 nn.)
are not straight matches either. The opposite of clementia is not severitas (see 2.4.1 n.)
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itself another virtue) but saevitia (see 1.25-26, 2.4.2 nn.) crudelitas (see 1.2.2, 1.7.3,
1.25.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.3 nn.), and feritas (see 2.4.2 n)” (Clementia, 39).125
Seneca builds his concept of clemency off of its opposing features to cruelty.
Mueller elaborates “cruelty is, according to Seneca, viciousness and savagery (atrocitas)
in punishing as well as an inclination of the spirit towards harshness. Cruelty, like other
vices, arises from the emotions (Ep. 85.10)… The motivation for such cruel behavior is
pleasure” (Cruelty, 168). He also highlights that the ruler has a larger propensity for
cruelty since his actions can affect a wider scope of individuals thru political punishment
and war. The private citizen, while also capable of cruelty, is nowhere close to exercising
the potential cruelty of a ruler. And thus cruelty, in Seneca’s analysis, is thought to rest
on unequal power (Cruelty, 167-168).
In De ira Seneca further distinguishes clemency from cruelty. Dowling writes
“clemency takes less work than anger and that people who are clement have better
reputations and more often get what they want.” Aside from the political gains of using
clementia, “the pleasures of granting clemency are superior to and more secure than the
awful pleasure in the suffering of others that cruelty provides” (Clemency, 203-204).
Seneca asks quid est animi quiete otiosius, quid ira laboriosius? quid clementia remissius
quid crudelitate negotiosius? (De clem.1, 2.13.2). Seneca stresses the point that the
pursuit of anger and cruelty is exhausting while granting clemency is quick and energy125

OLD defines these terms (in order as they are presented above, excluding clementia) as: “tendernessheartedness, pity, compassion (1118); mildness, clemency (1074); moderation (as a quality of persons),
self-control, moderation in the use of (1121); kindness, esp. on the part of a superior, favour, bounty, or sim
(888); mildness of character or behavior, gentleness (1016); friendliness, considerateness, courtesy,
graciousness (360); forgiveness, pardon (2029); to refrain from inflicting injury, etc. be merciful, spare
(1295); to forgive (a person or offense ellipt. or absol.) (825); strict and uncompromising conduct in
dealing with offenders, sternness, severity; an instance of sternness (1750); savageness of conduct of
character, barbarity, cruelty (1678); cruelty, savagery, inhumanity of a person (462); and barbaric and
savage state of men (687). Seneca seems to be offering a unique view on forgiveness, these definitions
overlap and intertwine yet he claims they do not fully capture clementia.
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saving; the latter is what leads to a better life.126 Seneca also advocates clemency over
cruelty because the latter corrupts the mind (2.5.3). Dowling writes “clemency
counteracts this perversion and keeps us true to ourselves…We thus benefit ourselves as
much as those we spare. This is a startling development in Roman ethics, that mercy not
only is of utilitarian benefit to the pardoner and to the spared [as seen in its political
power] but actually has a profound effect on the moral worth of the donor” (Clemency,
205).
Seneca gives due consideration to why the Emperor specifically ought to grant
clemency. These reasons are pragmatic (Dowling, Clemency, 192). Seneca stresses that
the emperor who grants clemency lives in a more prosperous and orderly state: remissius
imperanti melius paretur (De clem.1, 1.24.1).127 However, Seneca acknowledges there is
a line that needs to be drawn in distinguishing how merciful the ruler is. Granting too
much mercy can lose its intended effect: non tamen vulgo ignoscere decet; nam ubi
discrimen inter malos bonosque sublatum est, confusion sequitur et vitiorum eruption;
itaque adhibenda moderatio est, quae sanabilia ingenia distinguere a deploratis sciat
(De clem.2, 1.2.2).128 If the correct dosage of clemency is given, one can bring safety to
the state; “cruelty toward a few generates fear in all, and this fear might very well spur
peaceful men to violent action. A policy of mercy forestalls this danger” (Dowling,
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Dowling (Clemency, 204) notes that philosophically the argument is not “convincing because often
cruelty can be quite casual and incidental, the punishments that Seneca has in mind are rooted in the public
world of law, not philosophy; the routine punishments of the amphitheater, the crucifixions, burnings, and
maimings of convicted criminals. These indeed did take energy, expense, and planning.” I agree with
Dowling that the argument is not convincing but I think Seneca raises a point I emphasize in my account of
modern forgiveness: forgiveness aims to prevent the victim from sustaining the psychological effects of an
injury she suffered much like Seneca’s point that the process of pursuing cruelty is contrary to well-being.
127
“The more tolerantly he rules the more easily he commands obedience.”
128
“Nevertheless, pardoning ought not to be too common; for when the distinction between the bad and the
good is removed, the result is confusion and an epidemic of vice. Therefore, a wise moderation should be
exercised which will be capable of distinguishing between curable and hopeless characters.”
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Clemency, 197). Seneca has some kind of threshold in mind. Prevalent mercy will not
deter citizens from doing wrong and they will in turn take advantage of a clement ruler.
On the other hand, too little mercy can make the people think the ruler is a tyrant and thus
despise him for his cruelty. So, clementia is form of public policy.
It is also a form of nutrition. Seneca argues clemency is in the best interest of the
emperor because granting clemency improves the practitioner’s health, i.e. the emperor’s
health. Just like the citizens are extension of the Emperor, he ought to take care of them
like he would his own body:
Nam si, quod adhuc colligit, tu animus rei puclicae tuae es, illa corpus
tuum, vides, ut puto, quam necessaria sit clementia; tibi enim parcis, cum
videris alteri parcere. Parcendum itaque est etiam improbandis civibus
non aliter quam membris languentibus… (De clem.1, 1.5.1).129
However, we do not see a morally compelling reason to grant clemency. This seems to be
another one of Seneca’s political analogies to persuade Nero why he ought to grant
clemency more: for preserving social order. But this may sound similar to ‘maximizing
one’s well-being’ and thus analogous to keeping one’s body healthy. If I argue for this
analogy then I am basically admitting the moral reasons we forgive are really motivated
by health reasons. However for the sake of analogy to the state, I can see why Seneca
prescribed the Nero’s malady of cruelty with clemency.
Seneca gives more reasons why one ought to grant clemency. He goes on to claim
clementia “elevates the soul to a higher plane of virtue” (Dowling, Clemency, 200).
Seneca writes that, ultimately, practicing clementia is good for the well-being of the
practitioner: quotiens nulam inveneram misericordiae causam, mihi peperci (De clem.1,

129

“You are showing mercy to yourself when you seem to be showing it to someone else. So you should
show mercy even to citizens who deserve condemnation just as you would to ailing limbs.
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1.1.4).130 That is, the victim should grant clemency for her own sake. Furthermore, a
healthy state of mind is one that does not give in to the propensity for cruelty.131 Seneca
claims it is harder for a ruler to use reason because cruelty is an “expression of the
irrational mind; clemency is proof of the rational mind.”132 We thus ought to grant
clemency for a moral reason: it is good for the practitioner’s well-being since it can
elevate her to a higher level of virtue and preserve her rationality. Hence, Seneca has
three basic moral reasons for showing clemency: 1) it elevates one’s soul; 2) it makes the
practitioner a happier and better man; and 3) it preserves the rationality of the
practitioner.
Now let us return to the question posed earlier: do either the first or third
interpretation of clementia fully fit my view of forgiveness (i.e. they do not just share
similar definitions).133 By definition alone, the first interpretation of clementia is identical
to modern forgiveness, i.e. forswearing revenge is restraining resentment. However, this
alone does not complete the analysis. If it did then forswearing revenge alone would be
all that forgiveness is about but I advocated for more than that. I advocated for
forswearing revenge to maximize the moral well-being of the victim in response to a
moral injury. We do not simply forswear revenge because then we can forswear revenge
on a whim and this is not forgiveness. Forgiveness is a choice with moral backing.
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Dowling writes that Seneca is interested guiding Nero to become a “better and happier man.”
(Clemency, 199)
131
Remember, the practice of cruelty indicates a corrupt mind (similar to Butler’s views). “Real clemency
in a position of supreme power, consists of the most real control of the mind and <of an all-inclusive love>
of human-kind <as love of oneself>, of not being corrupted by any desire or by natural impetuosity…”
(Braund, Clementia, 115). In Seneca’s words: haec est in maxima potestate verissima animi temperantia et
humani generis comprendens ut sui amor non cupiditate aliqua, non temeritate ingenii (Clem. 1.11.2).
132
Dowling, Clemency, 199-200. Seneca explains cruelty in more detail in De irae but also in De
clementia. (2.4.1-3).
133
To remind the reader, the first interpretation is ‘restraint of the mind when it is able to take revenge’ and
the third is ‘tendency of the mind toward leniency when exacting punishment’ (Braund, Clementia, 143).
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However, some may find well-being in pursuing revenge but if that occurs than
forgiveness is no longer possible. I have given this issue due consideration in chapter one.
I find it hard to deny that the three reasons for showing clemency given above,
combined with Seneca’s first interpretation of clementia, amount to forgiveness. I
discussed well-being as attempting to achieve the most peace of mind in response to an
injury. These three reasons do just that. I understand the first reason to mean bettering
oneself in the form of moral enlightenment, not creating a hierarchy of inferior
wrongdoer and superior forgiver. I understand the second reason an undeniable indication
that this refers to well-being. How else can this be construed? I understand the third
reason to contribute to peace of mind, the source of well-being. Irrational individuals are
not at peace of mind. However, are the reasons Seneca gives related to moral injury? If
Seneca isn’t referring to clemency as a response to moral injury then our perspectives
will not coordinate. Moral wrongdoing is one of the basic preconditions of contemporary
forgiveness. The third interpretation stands for similar reasons and I will explore
Seneca’s thoughts on clemency versus punishment to make sure.
Seneca brings the first book of De clementia to a close by contrasting clementia
with punishment. Seneca assumes the role of punishment is to correct wrongdoers and the
best way to correct them is to impose more lenient punishment. While it seems counterintuitive, Seneca claims harsh punishment backfires on the state since this will enrage the
people. Dowling suggests Seneca believes that harsh punishment can also create a cycle
of repeating crime and is ultimately ineffective. Furthermore, too much punishment is
detrimental because it portrays society as littered with criminals, undermining the state’s
sense of security (Clemency, 198-99). Seneca, thus, believes punishment is necessary for
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the rehabilitation of wrongdoers but that punishment must be exercised wisely; we ought
to show offenders clementia instead of punishment for the stability of the state.134 Seneca
sums this is by stating:
Civitatis autem mores magis corrigit parcitas animadversionum; facit
enim consuetudinem peccandi multitude peccantium, et minus gravis nota
est, quam turba damnationum levat, et severitas, quod maximum
remedium habet, adsiduitate amittat auctoritatem (De clem.1, 1.22.2) 135
Seneca goes on to claim that in society which punishment is not as frequent, the
community members will develop a stronger sympathy for moral cohesion. And thus
such members will act accordingly for the public good (De clem.1, 1.23.2).
Seneca believes there is no glory from punishment. He writes nulla regi gloria est
ex saeva animadversione (quis enim dubitat posse?), at contra maxima, si vim suam
continent, si multos irae alienae eripuit, neminem suae impendit (De clem.1, 1.16.3).136
Here we see practicing clementia as a means to achieving glory and the dignitas that
marks honorable Roman men (i.e. the case with Caesar). Being the granter of clemency is
a position of power. According to Seneca, anyone can take the life of another but one can
only show mercy to an inferior: vita enim etiam superiori eripitur, numquam nisi inferiori

134

Even if we assume Seneca is correct in saying too much punishment or too harsh punishment begets
more crime and instability in the state, why does he think the Roman emperor, or individuals in general,
need to grant wrongdoers clementia? This may presuppose a false dichotomy that the Roman emperor can
only punish or show mercy. Aren’t there other ways a ruler cannot punish a wrongdoer while not showing
clemency? Seneca doesn’t seem to address this. On a separate note, I do not agree with Seneca that we
ought to show clemency rather than punish. However, I think Seneca is strictly referring to state
punishment here.
135
“The sparingness of punishment is more effective in correcting public morality. The existence of a large
number of criminals in fact creates a habit of criminality. The stigma is taken less seriously when it is
weakened by a plethora of condemnations, and severity, which provides the most efficacious corrective,
loses its impact by repeated use.”
136
“A king gets no glory at all from savage punishment− after all, who doubts that he is capable of that? By
contrast, the greatest glory is his if he restrains his powers, if he rescues many people from other people’s
anger and exposes no one to his own anger.”
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datur.137 I think Seneca expresses this as a matter of socioeconomic status and privilege
in Rome: servare proprium est excellantis fortunae (De clem.1, 1.5.7) as the politics of
clementia.
So far the discussion on clementia versus punishment has not offered us much
insight into whether or not Seneca had moral injuries, interpersonal conflicts, in mind.
Perhaps we can find the answers in a few other parts of his work.
For the everyday Roman, clemency is acknowledged in its “reciprocity”
(Dowling, Clemency, 201). Seneca implies a principle of commonality in clementia. We
all have the “propensity to do wrong and [at one point in our lives] the need to receive
mercy at some point;” this underscores the notion that “a man who displays an inclination
to clemency is more worthy to receive mercy than is the man who lives a cruel life.”138
Butler’s emphasis on loving our enemies reflects this principle. However, I will reiterate
why it is a bad reason. To justify forgiveness on these grounds is to essentially supposing
“against ample evidence to the contrary that people have no control over what they make
of their upbringing and experiences and that different people will be affected in the same
way by similar upbringing and experiences.”139 And if they had no control over their
wrongdoing, they ought to be excused, not forgiven. Also, the common humanity
argument drastically fails to account for morally heinous agents that commit terrible
crimes.140
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Dowling, Clemency, 200.
Dowling, Clemency, 201.
139
Kekes, Blame, 503.
140
This was one of my major criticisms against Butler’s account in Chapter One.
138
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Clementia became a matter of morality for the common man as it “permeated
Roman life.”141 Seneca writes to Nero and addresses the importance of rulers granting
clemency for an effective, lasting rule; his work also “has completed the development of
the ethic of clemency from a quality seen primarily as opportunistic and tainted, as it was
regarded after Julius Caesar’s death, to a sublime quality, to an ethic essential to the
nature of the good man” (Dowling, Clemency, 205). And I think the nature of the good
man extends to the Roman people, not just the emperor. Furthermore, I think it extends to
the moral realm of the Roman people. In other words, Seneca transformed clementia into
a way people can conceptualize moral rehabilitation from moral wrongdoing.142 De
clementia emphasizes the ruler for two reasons: 1) it was written for one and for his
praise and 2) what more confirmation would the Roman people need to practice
clementia if their ruler was the epitome of it? In other words, by making the ruler the face
of clementia, Seneca gave the Roman people a role model for practicing forgiveness.
I have argued for why my account of forgiveness captures Seneca’s work on
clementia. The paradigm account fails to capture it because there is no textual evidence
that supports clementia was conceived as an interpersonal, conditional moral
phenomenon. More specifically, it neglects the change of heart component. My account
succeeds in capturing clementia (under Seneca’s philosophy) because forgiveness is an
intrapersonal, unconditional account. However, my findings are sure to be criticized. I
will reflect on possible criticisms now.
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Dowling, Clemency, 217.
Also, I am not so sure there would even be another context in which Seneca wishes to promote
clementia. In other words, if he isn’t writing for the general public of Rome to be forgiving in their
responses to moral wrongdoing then what is he writing for the public to be forgiving for?
142
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Seneca and I would promote forgiving because it is good for our moral sake;
moreover that “it relieves us of destructive emotions, such as resentment, bitterness,
anger, hatred, and indignation.”143 In this instance, forgiving disregards the recipient and
focuses on preventing oneself from being corrupted by cruelty. While some may argue
this reasoning is flawed because it misses the point of forgiveness (Kekes, Blame, 489) as
a good in so far as it in involves the wrongdoer, I suggest the ‘good’ in forgiveness is
whether the act of forgiving fulfills its purpose. Like I have argued earlier, the purpose of
forgiveness, in sheer understanding of moral reparation, is to maximize well-being in
response to injury. And whether this be “elevating one’s soul” or not being corrupted by
vengeful resentment. Seneca’s work seems to have the same message.
But again, the most common argument against my claim (and what I take to be
Seneca’s) is that it may indeed be in our well-being to act cruel and avenge our offender.
This may bring the victim to some sort of psychological equilibrium, which in effect
contributes to them feeling pretty good about ‘settling the score.’ I stated earlier that I
concede this point and I admit we ought not always seek to forgive. However, I think
there is a distinction that might be made here. It is in our self-interest to exact revenge but
this will limit us from achieving potential well-being. Exacting revenge is ultimately
contrary to our well-being because it brings a type of moral baggage. This moral baggage
may become clear to the victim when they give a cost-benefit analysis of the revenge
plot. However, it is difficult, probably impossible to predict how exacting revenge or
granting clemency will affect one’s well-being in the future. Furthermore, choosing
cruelty over clemency conditions people in line with the propensity toward acting
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Kekes, Blame, 488.
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harshly. And a propensity towards acting in this way makes our tendency to err that much
more likewise.
Another criticism may be that I have entirely missed the point of clementia and I
am building it up to be something it isn’t, i.e. clementia is strictly a virtue. One of the
primary aims of De clementia is to discuss “why clementia, the most appropriate virtue
for man, is particularly important in a ruler.”144 Konstan writes that “clementia was by its
nature ‘the virtue of a superior to an inferior” (Virtue, 339). If this were true, then it
would be difficult for me to equate forgiveness and clementia because I agree with
Kekes; “forgiveness cannot possibly be a virtue because virtues are character traits and
forgiveness is not. Forgiveness is an event in people’s lives that may be unique, rare, or
uncharacteristic…. A character trait that prevents reasonable response to moral injury and
leads people to refuse to hold wrongdoers accountable cannot possibly be a virtue.”145
Griswold may offer a slightly varied objection. He may say that upon completion
of the necessary conditions we ought to forgive because it is the thing to do and
“forgivingness is a virtue… Forgivingness is a virtue that both expresses and promotes
the ethical excellence of its possessor (Forgiveness, 69)” But say one forgives habitually
because it is their character to do so; isn’t this actually a vice? There are times in which
we really should punish individuals and by facilely forgiving them we are actually
“colluding in the violation of moral requirements” our community upholds for
stability.146 Griswold may say that “in spite of common parlance, one cannot be too
forgiving (for one is then not forgiving but doing something else). To exercise the virtue
is by definition to feel and to act just as one should given the particulars of the situation
144

Griffin, Seneca, 143.
Blame, 492-493.
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Ibid., 493.
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(Forgiveness, 17).” However, isn’t this a definitional stop? In other words, Griswold, or a
supporter of his, cannot simply dismiss the possibility of forgiving too much when having
the virtue of forgivingness makes forgiving a habit. It is essentially precluding one from
criticism by claiming immunity from the slippery slope of forgiving frequently out of
character and not out of the analyzing the specific circumstances wrongdoings.
So then why does Seneca promote clementia as a virtue? I think he certainly does
this and he promotes clementia as forgiveness. Seneca certainly depicts an honorable
ruler as one who possesses clementia. However, Seneca writes si quando misso sanguine
opus est, sustinenda est manus, ne ultra, quam necesse sit, incidat (De clem.2, 1.5.1).147
This acknowledges the moral choice on behalf of the practitioner of clementia. If they
have a choice, then it is reasonable clementia is an event and not merely a character
disposition. For if it were only a virtue, then rulers would be granting clementia
habitually because it is in their character to do so yet Seneca calls for a balance of
clementia (De clem.2, 1.2.2.). So, perhaps we should think of clementia in two distinct
contexts for two different audiences; one as a guide for the Roman princeps and the other
as an ethic for the common Roman.
In conclusion, Seneca’s De clementia foretells contemporary forgiveness. In other
words, his work reflects forgiveness as we know it today. His definition of clementia
calls for restraint in exacting revenge or leniency when imposing punishment. My
account deems modern forgiveness is forswearing vengeful resentment. Furthermore,
both accounts emphasize the victim, or practitioner of clementia, forgiving to maximize
their well-being in response to an injury. Even though Seneca does not describe this
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“If there should ever be need to let blood [punish], the hand must be held under control to keep it from
cutting deeper than may be necessary.”
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verbatim, the textual evidence suggests the reasons for granting clemency involve
maximizing one’s well-being. He also supplies reasons why the ruler should forgive.
Also, even though I have argued contemporary forgiveness materialized in Seneca’s
work, I am not comfortable concluding contemporary forgiveness materialized in
practice; the textual evidence was lacking in this examination. It is important to note that
the textual evidence also does not explicitly claim clementia was meant to be the moral
remedy to moral wrongdoing. However, are there really any other better ways of
understanding his work? Finally, while forgiveness should not be considered a virtue,
clementia can be understood as both a virtue for a successful ruler and moral event for the
Roman people. Seneca’s philosophy foretold contemporary forgiveness.
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CONCLUSION

This paper explored contemporary forgiveness in ancient Rome. In doing so, I
analyzed the practice of clementia by Julius Caesar and the philosophy of clementia by
Lucuius Annaeus Seneca. These two topics interested me because these figures were
responsible for influencing the concept of clementia in ancient Rome in significant ways.
This project had two major parts.
First, I wanted to explore different perspectives on contemporary forgiveness and
develop my own account. By no means have I exhausted the different perspectives on
forgiveness; there are many. My choices reflect what I take to be a fundamental divide in
thought on forgiveness: one side believes it is an interpersonal, conditional moral event
while the other side argues for an intrapersonal, unconditional view. The former exists as
the paradigm sense of forgiveness, explained by Griswold and endorsed by Konstan. I
argued against this view (with the help of Kekes) while trying to establish my own
understanding of forgiveness. My understanding reflects many elements Zaibert and
Butler include in their work on forgiveness.
My account of forgiveness is humbling in the sense that it attempts to call
forgiveness for what it truly is, regardless of how we desire it to be. I argue it is a way in
which humans deal with suffering from moral injury. My account of forgiveness
advocates an intrapersonal moral phenomenon by the victim, for the victim. Victims of
moral wrongdoing forgive to maximize their well-being in response to the injury they
suffer. I have distinguished appropriate resentment from vengeful resentment as ways in
which victims can respond to personal injury. I attempt to reconcile the desire to punish
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with the desire to forgive by saying it is permissible to want an offender punished via
expressions punish of non-vengeful resentment after the victim forswears revenge.
Punishing wrongdoers is essential to our system of morals and it may be better for
victims for them to maximize their moral well-being by exacting revenge or other
immoral acts of punishment. Hence, I concede victims will choose to punish rather
forgive their offenders. This is why I do not argue victims ought to forgive.
I have argued that the paradigm is unreasonably bilateral and conditional. First,
the repentance of the offender does not need to change the victim’s resentment triggered
by the specific wrongdoing. Ultimately, the victim chooses how to deal with her
resentment independent of the wrongdoer’s actions. If she chooses forgiveness, she will
forego the pursuit of revengeful resentment. If she does not choose forgiveness, she can
seek revenge (among other responses). Hence, I have argued against the second threshold
condition in Griswold’s review of paradigm forgiveness, namely, there is a willingness of
the offender to take minimal steps in qualifying for forgiveness. This is why I also argue
against forgiveness is a communicative act.
Critics may argue my account fails to capture the essence of forgiveness, the
change-in-heart among the parties involved. This is an unnecessarily fabricated part of
forgiveness. Again, why does a victim need to communicate his or her forgiveness to the
offender? And why does an offender need to qualify for forgiveness by expressing
remorse? It is ultimately the victim’s choice in how she wishes to proceed in her moral
rehabilitation. Furthermore, a victim as well as offender can have callous or indifferent
responses to such expressions. And these individuals shouldn’t be precluded from
participating in forgiveness.
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My conclusions rest on whether or not I have adequately established my account
of forgiveness. If the reader agrees with my description of forgiveness, then the reader
may be compelled to agree with the claims I make about clementia and forgiveness in
ancient Rome. This brings me to the second part of my project: searching for traces of
forgiveness in ancient Rome.
My first case study presented me with no strong evidence. In this case I discussed
the differences between political forgiveness and moral forgiveness, or supplication and
forgiveness. Clementia Caesaris was a political weapon used to subdue defeated enemies
and supplicate political rivalries. It was a machine to solidify rule both inside and outside
Rome; Caesar was its mastermind. This did not replicate modern day forgiveness.
Clementia in this context misses the point of moral forgiveness; namely, forgiveness aims
to maximize the well-being of the victim in response to an injury. Clementia Caesaris
had no moral rationale. And even if it did, the political motivations trumped the morality
driving it. Caesar’s clemency was an example of pardon. And even what seems to be a
strong case of forgiving his deceased former friend can be written off as something else.
While one may argue the tears Caesar wept expressed remorse for Pompey’s death, this
scenario does not fit my account of forgiveness because there was no evidence for
personal injury. Caesar may have lamented because an honorable Roman met a
dishonorable death. On the issue of Caesar being a forgiver, he was simply a warmonger
turned politician who eventually succumbed to his own pernicious politics.
My second case study presented me with strong enough evidence to argue
forgiveness in ancient Rome materialized in Seneca’s philosophy on clementia. When
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Seneca enters the Roman political scene clementia undergoes a philosophical
transformation. Dowling explains the transformation of nicely:
With Seneca’s creation of a philosophy of clemency, clementia, became a
quality of men in general, demonstrable even by slaves toward their
superiors, an inherently human quality and, paradoxically, a sign of the
superior self-control and strength of the grantor so that the extension of
clemency conferred status on the giver. In all these aspects, the nature of
clementia has changed from the dangerous grants of Julius Caesar. The
reception of imperial clemency, while never something that raised one’s
prestige, at least was not seen as political suicide (Clemency, 217).
I argued Seneca’s definition of clementia and justification for showing it both
align with my account. The best-fitting interpretation of his definition was restraint in
having revenge. The other interpretation entailed a tendency to be lenient in exacting
punishment. I argued with this is also fitting to my account. They both involve the
forswearing of vengeful resentment. Seneca offers three reasons, among others, why one
should forgive. These reasons also align with my account. One should show clemency
because it elevates one soul, contributes to one being a better and happier man, and
preserve one’s rationality, e.g. a calm state of mind. I argue all of these reasons culminate
into maximizing one’s moral well-being. The last part of this task involved finding
evidence that Seneca wrote about granting clementia to maximize one’s well-being in the
context of moral injury. I admit I did not find any concrete textual support, but I still
argue why this is the best way to understand the clementia in this context. However, just
because Seneca wrote about clementia in philosophical prose does not mean it was a
customary practice. Also, I have only used one treatise to support my thesis. Hence the
matter is not nearly conclusive but I think I have offered the reader good reason to think
twice about doubting the notion of contemporary forgiveness in De clementia.
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Nonetheless one may argue that clementia is simply a virtue and that I have
unfairly built something out of nothing. I understand Seneca’s clementia as more than a
character trait for a successful, benign ruler. As Dowling notes above, clementia became
an “inherently human quality,” which even slaves displayed towards their masters. Since
clementia permeated the social boundaries of Roman life, I am inclined to think it was
not just a virtue but also the foretelling of contemporary forgiveness. Furthermore, I
suggest clementia has an amoebic nature; it serves different purposes in different
contexts. Clementia the virtue for rulers was one way in which it was emphasized and
clementia as an act of contemporary forgiveness was another. Perhaps many scholars
have easily overlooked clementia as a manifestation of modern forgiveness because they
do not understand clementia having different meanings in different contexts.
David Konstan has written extensively on forgiveness in antiquity. His negative
conclusions prompted me to undertake this project. I have learned the way in which we
define things greatly determines the way in which we can use them. We define
forgiveness in almost diametrically opposed ways and have come to argue different
perspectives on this issue. Nevertheless, I hope to have presented an insightful project
that guides the reader through a fresh understanding of forgiveness, an exciting
exploration of clementia Caesaris, and a fruitful exploration of clementia’s philosophical
roots to see that modern forgiveness did exist in ancient Rome thought.
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